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ABSTRACT
This Article engages the two-hundred-year history of corporate
constitutional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court
has long accorded rights to corporations based on the rationale that
corporations represent associations of people from whom such rights
are derived. The Article draws on the history of business corporations
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in America to argue that the Court’s characterization of corporations
as associations made sense throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
tury. By the late nineteenth century, however, when the Court was
deciding several key cases involving corporate rights, this associa-
tional view was already becoming a poor fit for some corporations.
The Court’s failure to account for the wide spectrum of organizations
labeled “corporations” became increasingly problematic with the rise
of modern business corporations that could no longer be fairly char-
acterized as an identifiable group of people acting in association.
Nonetheless, the Court continued to apply the associational rationale
from early case law and expand corporate rights into the realm of
speech and political spending without careful analysis of when the
associational approach would be appropriate.
We set forth a theoretical framework that we believe is consistent
with the underlying logic of the Court’s jurisprudence, based on the
concepts of derivative and instrumental rights. Specifically, we argue
that the Court, to date, has not granted constitutional rights to
corporations in their own right. Instead, it has granted rights to cor-
porations either derivatively, when necessary to protect the rights
of natural persons assumed to be represented by the corporation,
or instrumentally, when necessary to protect the rights of parties out-
side the corporation. Further, we consider the implications that this
framework, with a more nuanced view of the spectrum of corpora-
tions in existence, would have if applied to recent corporate rights
cases, such as Citizens United. We believe this framework provides
a principled path forward for the difficult line drawing between
corporations that needs to be done.
2015] CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1675
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1676
I. EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING 
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1680
II. CORPORATIONS IN EARLY AND PRE-TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1697
A. Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century: 
Business Corporations Before General 
Incorporation Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1697
B. 1840-1895: Rapid Growth in the Use of 
Business Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
C. 1895-Early 1900s: Mergers and Consolidations and 
the Rise of Modern Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1706
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S TWENTIETH-CENTURY CORPORATE 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE AND APPROACH TO THE RISE OF 
MODERN CORPORATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1708
A. Giant Corporations Emerge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1709
B. Corporate Criminal Liability, Related Protections, and 
Other Early Twentieth-Century Legal Developments . . 1713
C. Corporate Rights Jurisprudence on the 
First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1719
IV. TOWARDS A CONSISTENT FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING 
CORPORATE CLAIMS TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS . . 1731
A. Using the Logic of the Derivative Rights Rationale . . . . 1732
B. Conceptual Challenges in Corporate Rights 
Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1738
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1742
1676 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1673
INTRODUCTION
Many Americans believe that the Supreme Court surely must
have gotten it wrong in Citizens United v. FEC when the Court held
that corporations can spend unlimited amounts of corporate trea-
sury money on independent political expenditures.1 Politicians and
grassroots organizations have called for a fix to Citizens United in
the courts or through the political process.2 Legal scholars have
examined Citizens United in depth—both defending and criticizing
the case on a number of grounds—often engaging with the case
primarily in the context of the First Amendment, campaign finance
jurisprudence, or modern business law.3
Justice Frankfurter once observed that “[t]he history of American
constitutional law in no small measure is the history of the impact
of the modern corporation.”4 In that spirit, we add to the contempo-
rary debate by examining corporate history from the earliest corpo-
rations in America through today’s multinational conglomerates to
shed light on the Court’s recent corporate rights jurisprudence, to
help us see its logic and its flaws, and to provide insight into future
cases. The story of Citizens United, as well as of other recent cases,
such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., concerning the reli-
gious liberty rights of business corporations,5 are but a chapter in a
1. 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens
United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corpor-
ations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011).
3. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010); see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence,
109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV.
118 (2010); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012);
Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010);
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who De-
cides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law
Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 497 (2010).
4. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
63 (1937).
5. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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much longer tale about the history of corporations in America and
their treatment under the Constitution.
In this Article, we take up a set of questions about the history of
corporations and corporate rights jurisprudence to better under-
stand what the Supreme Court has wrought: What was the Court’s
understanding of the nature of corporations at the time that it
decided some of the key early cases on the constitutional rights of
corporations? Was this consistent with the population of corpora-
tions at the time? How did the Court’s understanding evolve as it
decided subsequent cases? Was the Court’s understanding consis-
tent with the role and function that corporations have played in
society? And if not, how might a different or better understanding
of corporations have led to a better outcome of corporate constitu-
tional rights decisions by the Court?
In examining these questions, we find that the Court accorded
constitutional rights based on a view of corporations as associations
of persons, and that this view was largely consistent with what the
actual population of corporations in the United States looked like
during the period of the Court’s earliest jurisprudence. But this
characterization was already a poor fit for some corporations by the
late nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Court’s characterization
of corporations as associations has not properly evolved to account
for the wide spectrum of organizations labeled “corporations.” This
has become increasingly problematic as the Court has moved from
early case law concerning the property and contract rights of cor-
porations to the realm of corporate speech, political spending, and
exercise of religion.
We then articulate a theoretical framework which we believe is
consistent with the underlying logic of the Court’s jurisprudence,
based on the concepts of derivative and instrumental rights. We
consider the implications of applying this framework, along with an
appreciation of the spectrum of corporations in existence, to recent
corporate rights cases, such as Citizens United. We argue that this
framework provides a path forward in the very difficult and neces-
sary project of line drawing between corporations. In this way, we
attempt to draw upon a richer history of corporations and case law
concerning the scope of their constitutional protection to theorize a
more nuanced and grounded treatment of corporations.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we review Supreme
Court decisions involving corporations and constitutional rights
through the nineteenth century to show that even if not clearly
articulated, the Court’s reasoning in these cases was based on an
understanding of corporations as associations of individuals—more
like partnerships or membership organizations than the large, pub-
licly traded business corporations of today. This tracing of early case
law shows that despite public perceptions, the Court has never
based its corporate rights jurisprudence on the idea that a corpora-
tion is a constitutionally protected “person” in its own right. The
Court has instead granted constitutional rights to corporations to
derivatively protect the rights of the natural persons that are as-
sumed to be represented by the corporation, or that are interacting
with the corporation.
In Part II, we observe that the Court’s view of corporations as
associations of persons was largely consistent with what the actual
population of corporations in the United States looked like until
the late nineteenth century. However, by that time, when the Court
was deciding several important cases on the constitutional rights
of corporations, it was becoming problematic to regard all corpora-
tions as associations. American businesses were undergoing a dra-
matic transformation. Some business corporations were becoming
much larger, with business activities that spanned the continent
and even extended internationally. A number of huge corporations
were formed by the merging together of groups of smaller corpora-
tions. Some of the larger corporations had thousands of employees.
They were also quickly becoming publicly traded, with hundreds,
and sometimes thousands of passive investors. They were becoming
professionally managed, so that they no longer reflected the goals,
aspirations, and efforts of a founder or a few individual investors.
They were taking on identities—often tied to brands—that were
truly separate from any of their individual investors, directors, or
managers, and their separate corporate identities were being pro-
moted to facilitate their interactions with customers, suppliers,
employees, and the communities in which they operated.
By about 1910, a sizable class of very large, branded, publicly
traded corporations had emerged, and for these entities, it was no
longer credible that they would be seen as proxies for the interests
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of a well-defined and identifiable group of individual investors or
other participants. Although there might have been some matters
in which such a corporation could appropriately be viewed as repre-
senting the aggregate interests of its investors (or perhaps of its
managers, employees, or customers), in many matters, its interests
could not be clearly identified with any particular group of indi-
viduals. Meanwhile, the corporate form continued to be used for
nonprofits, cooperatives, political units, clubs, and advocacy associ-
ations, for which the idea of the corporation as a proxy for an asso-
ciation of individuals remained valid. Thus, the spectrum of types
of organizations encompassed by the term “corporation” had rapidly
expanded over the course of the nineteenth century. This change
made it increasingly problematic for the Court to broadly rule on
constitutional rights as to all corporations in general.
In Part III, we examine how the Supreme Court responded to
the rise of modern business corporations. In the early twentieth
century, the Court recognized corporate criminal liability and cer-
tain constitutional protections for corporations in the context of
searches and trials. And since the 1970s, the Court has recognized
protections for commercial speech, corporate political spending, and
statutory protection for religious free exercise. Yet we find that de-
spite the transformation in the types of corporations in existence,
and the different legal questions presented, the Court has not
carefully analyzed its legal theory of corporate rights, nor has it
expressly articulated a framework for thinking about corporations
that could guide its decision making in a consistent way.
In Part IV, we observe that even without such a framework, the
Court consistently treated corporate rights as either derivative or
instrumental rights. From this observation, we propose a framework
for thinking about when a corporation should be extended constitu-
tional protections. First, we focus on the derivative rights rationale
as a line-drawing mechanism. If the Court is going to recognize a
corporate right, it should be able to identify the specific group of
natural persons from whom the corporate right is derived. Further,
the natural persons said to be represented by the corporation must
have associated for purposes related to the rights at issue in the
case. Second, we observe that when the Court instead uses an
instrumental rationale for according a corporate right, the basis for
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the right is weaker because it is further attenuated from a natural
person with an original basis for the right. This implies that some
constraint or regulation may be appropriate to ensure the purpose
of the right is served. We argue that many of the Supreme Court’s
corporate rights decisions fit well within this framework, at least as
to the facts of the specific cases if not to the breadth of the Court’s
rulings. Thus, this Article is a rethinking, but one that is conceptu-
ally rooted in the Court’s own jurisprudence. Moreover, the frame-
work provides a basis for line drawing in future cases when logic
and policy are not well served by granting the same constitutional
protections to all corporations.
I. EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not expressly refer to cor-
porations. The Supreme Court faced one of its earliest tasks of
interpreting how a constitutional provision applies to corporations
in the 1809 case Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.6 The case
concerned Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which
together with the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that the federal
judiciary may hear “cases” or “controversies” between “citizens” of
different states.7 Determining whether diversity jurisdiction existed
for natural persons was relatively straightforward, but it was un-
clear whether a corporation was a “citizen” for this purpose and if it
was, of what state the corporation was a citizen.
In holding that diversity jurisdiction exists when there is “com-
plete diversity” of state citizenship between the shareholders of a
corporate party and the opposing party, the Supreme Court looked
to the natural persons composing a corporation.8 The corporation in
the case, the first Bank of the United States, was established under
an act of Congress in 1791 and its shareholders, president, and
6. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
7. Id. at 87-88; see also Dudley O. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REV.
853, 879 (1943) (discussing diversity jurisdiction).
8. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 88-92. Complete diversity exists when none of the plain-
tiffs is a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. See, e.g., 13E CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605 (3d ed. 2013).
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directors were all citizens of Pennsylvania.9 It sued in the name of
“[t]he President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United
States,” and averred that the defendants, Deveaux and Roberts,
were citizens of Georgia.10 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall explained that the corporate entity itself was not a “citi-
zen.” The corporation had no right to sue or be sued in federal court
unless the Court looked to the rights of its “members”: “That invis-
ible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently,
cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the
rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in their
corporate name.”11
The Court found it could look to these members because “[s]ub-
stantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where the
members of the corporation are aliens, or citizens of a different state
from the opposite party, come within the spirit and terms of the
jurisdiction conferred by the constitution of the national tribu-
nals.”12 Relying on English law, the Court found precedent for un-
derstanding a corporation as “a mere creature of the law, invisible,
intangible, and incorporeal” yet also for including corporations
“within terms of description appropriated to real persons.”13 The
Court recounted one English case in which the “judges unanimously
declared that they could look beyond the corporate name, and notice
the character of the individual” rather than finding the “characters
9. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 62-63, 73 (argument of Binney for plaintiffs in error).
Two other cases were argued and considered together with Deveaux: Hope Insurance Co. v.
Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57, 57 (1809), involving two citizens of Massachusetts suing an
insurance company incorporated in Rhode Island, and Maryland Insurance Co. v. Woods, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 29, 43 (1810), involving a plaintiff that was a citizen of Pennsylvania and a
defendant insurance company composed of citizens of Maryland. The Court found the
averment in Hope Insurance Co. insufficient because it specified the state in which the
corporation was incorporated but did not allege the citizenship of the shareholders. Hope Ins.
Co., 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 61. It appears from the Deveaux holding and the subsequent consid-
eration of the Maryland Insurance Co. case on its merits that the Court found the averment
sufficient in that case as it indicated the citizenship of its members. Maryland Ins. Co., 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) at 43; Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61.
10. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 62, 73.
11. Id. at 86.
12. Id. at 87-88.
13. Id. at 87-88.
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of the individuals who composed it were completely merged.”14 Like-
wise, the Court noted that in the case at hand, “the corporate name
represents persons who are members of the corporation.”15
Thus, although the Court recognized that incorporating meant
creating a separate artificial being, from its earliest case considering
the treatment of corporations under the Constitution, the Court saw
the corporation as representing the identifiable group of people who
had chosen to associate through the corporate form. Partnerships
and corporations were therefore initially treated the same for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction.16
The Court continued to consider the interests of individuals who
had associated through the corporate form in the 1819 case Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.17 The twelve trustees of the col-
lege, who had been incorporated as “The Trustees of Dartmouth
College” to run the religious and literary institution, brought a suit
for the corporate property after the New Hampshire state legisla-
ture passed acts amending the corporate charter.18 The state legis-
lature’s acts gave the state control over the college by creating a
board of state-appointed overseers and transferring property vested
in the old trustees to a new board of trustees.19 At issue was wheth-
er the state legislature’s acts violated the Contract Clause of the
Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any law “impair-
ing the obligation of contracts.”20
The Court held that the New Hampshire state legislature’s act to
unilaterally alter the charter of Dartmouth College indeed violated
the Contract Clause.21 The Court reasoned that the corporate charter
14. Id. at 90.
15. Id. at 90-91 (explaining that the Court would “consider the character of the individuals
who compose” the corporation “when they use the name of the corporation, for the purpose of
asserting their corporate rights”).
16. Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability Companies for Diversity Jurisdiction,
6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 452 (2002). For cases following Deveaux, see Commercial
& R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840); Bank of the
United States v. Martin, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 479 (1831); Bretthaupt v. Bank of Georgia, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 238 (1828); and Sullivan v. Fulton Steamboat Co., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 450 (1821).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Id. at 550.
19. Id. at 539-49.
20. Id. at 588-89.
21. Id. at 518, 652-54; see also Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560 (1830)
(“It has been settled that a contract entered into between a state and an individual, is as fully
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was a contract as it effectively represented an agreement between
the people who applied for it and the government body that granted
it.22 Further, it was a contract within the meaning of the Contract
Clause because the corporate charter was for a private rather than
public institution.23 That is, the Contract Clause pertained to con-
tracts for private property—it “did not intend to restrain the States
in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal
government,” but rather to restrain state legislatures from impair-
ing “contracts respecting property, under which some individual
could claim a right to something beneficial to himself.”24 The case
therefore turned on whether the Court construed Dartmouth Col-
lege as private in nature. The Court reasoned that it was private
because despite incorporation requiring a government grant, the
founder had started the school at his own expense, and it was
further funded by private donations from individuals who wished to
promote its religious and educational aims.25 The donors no longer
had a direct interest in the property as it was an “eleemosynary,” or
charitable institution, but the Court explained that the corporation
“stands in their place” to distribute the property as they would have
done, through the acts of its trustees.26 In sum, in extending consti-
tutional protection to the corporation, the Court looked to the foun-
ders, donors, and trustees in identifying the human persons whose
rights would otherwise be impaired.
After rulings on diversity jurisdiction and the Contract Clause,
the Supreme Court addressed whether corporations were “citizens”
for purposes of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. In the
1839 case Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Court found there were
limits to the scope of constitutional protections for corporations.27 An
Alabama citizen had refused to honor bills of exchange issued by a
Georgia bank on the basis that the bank was a foreign corporation
protected by the tenth section of the first article of the constitution, as a contract between two
individuals; and it is not denied that a charter incorporating a bank is a contract.”). 
22. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 626-27.
23. Id. at 627-29.
24. Id. at 628-29.
25. Id. at 631-39.
26. Id. at 642.
27. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839).
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that had no right to contract outside of its chartering state.28 The
bank claimed that it had the rights of a “citizen” to enter another
state and conduct business.29 Although the case involved a bank, as
in Deveaux, in contrast to earlier approaches, the Court refused to
consider the individual members composing the corporation and
their interests.30
Chief Justice Taney expressed concern that relying on an associa-
tional view of the corporation might undermine the policy of share-
holder limited liability that was gaining acceptance at the time and
would put members of a corporation on higher ground than mem-
bers of a partnership when contracting in another state.31 In his
words:
If ... the members of a corporation were to be regarded as indi-
viduals carrying on business in their corporate name, and there-
fore entitled to the privileges of citizens in matters of contract,
it is very clear that they must at the same time take upon them-
selves the liabilities of citizens, and be bound by their contracts
in like manner.32
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court reasoned,
never intended to give citizens privileges and at the same time ex-
empt them from liabilities.33 When “a corporation makes a contract,
it is the contract of the legal entity” and the corporation itself is not
a “citizen” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.34
Instead, the principle of comity may permit a corporation to make
valid contracts in another state.35 The Court distinguished between
rights granted to corporations because the corporation served as a
28. Id. at 521-22.
29. Id. at 523-24.
30. Id. at 586-87.
31. Id. at 586; see also Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multina-
tional Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 306-07 (1990) (discussing Bank of Augusta v.
Earle).
32. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 586.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 587.
35. Id. at 588-92. Comity is a principle by which the courts of one jurisdiction voluntarily
give effect to the laws of another out of deference and respect. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions, Etc.
§ 670 (2013).
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proxy for its members, shareholders, or contributors, and rights that
were available only to citizens directly.
In the 1840s and 1850s, the Court reexamined its approach to
diversity jurisdiction, established earlier in Deveaux. In Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v. Letson, the Court overruled
Deveaux, finding that it was “carried too far” and not “entirely satis-
factory.”36 Letson involved a factual difficulty: the defendant railroad
had a banking corporation shareholder and an insurance company
shareholder, each of which had shareholders from New York, the
same state of citizenship as the plaintiff.37 If the Court had followed
Deveaux, federal jurisdiction would be lacking as diversity of state
citizenship was not complete between the railroad shareholders and
the plaintiff.38 Instead, the Court held that the corporation was a
“citizen” of the state in which it was incorporated, at least for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.39 That is, in contrast to its earlier
approach, the Court looked no further than the “artificial entity”
and its state of incorporation.40 However, just ten years later, in
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Court changed the ra-
tionale back to the notion that a suit by or against a corporation is
regarded as a suit by or against its shareholders.41 Further, in
determining the “citizenship” of the railroad, the Court established
a conclusive presumption that all shareholders of a corporation are
citizens of the state of incorporation.42 This approach offered the
logistical ease of Letson, while perpetuating the Deveaux Court’s
36. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554-56 (1844).
37. Id. at 551; see also id. at 498 (argument of Mazyck for plaintiffs in error).
38. Id. at 552; see also McGovney, supra note 7, at 879 (“It was that predicament that
forced the Court to overrule the Deveaux case.”).
39. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 555 (“A corporation created by a state to perform its
functions under the authority of that state and only suable there, though it may have
members out of the state, seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and
belonging to that state, and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be
deemed a citizen of that state.”). Before Letson, the Court had continued to follow Deveaux
when determining diversity jurisdiction and “would look beyond the mere corporate character,
to the individuals of whom it was composed.” Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v.
Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60, 64 (1840).
40. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 555. 
41. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-29 (1854).
42. Id. at 328-29. 
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vision of regarding the corporation as a citizen because of its share-
holders.43
The influence of these earlier cases was evident by the 1850s and
1860s. In Dodge v. Woolsey, in 1856, the Court allowed the share-
holder of a bank to bring suit in federal court against the bank and
its directors for refusing to challenge a tax assessment made against
the bank in violation of its original charter, which had set a lower
tax level.44 In this early shareholder derivative action, the Court
allowed for diversity jurisdiction, arguably extending and slightly
undermining its rationale in Marshall.45 Despite Marshall’s presum-
ption that all shareholders are citizens of the corporation’s state of
incorporation, the Court found diversity between the shareholder
and the corporation on the basis of the shareholder’s adverse stance
in the case.46 Yet at the same time, the Court was still following
Marshall’s general logic in determining the corporation’s state of
citizenship and the opinion reflected a willingness to look through
the corporation to see if an injury to the corporation was an injury
to its shareholders.
Further, the Dodge case reflected the influence of Dartmouth
College as the Court continued to hear Contract Clause claims in
cases involving corporate charters.47 Over time, this line of cases en-
gendered more controversy as jurists disagreed about whether and
how to give corporate charters strict construction and whether
states were allowed to modify or revoke special privileges with re-
gard to eminent domain, tax, or police regulations.48 Dodge illustrat-
ed this controversy with the majority ruling that the tax impaired
the obligation created under the corporate charter, and Justice
43. For a discussion of the subsequent history of federal jurisdiction rules, see Cohen,
supra note 16, at 455-62.
44. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 336, 346-47 (1856).
45. See id. at 341-45 (allowing a shareholder to sue his own corporation in equity where
there is a “breach of trust”).
46. Id. at 341.
47. In the nineteenth century, the Contract Clause was one of the most frequently
litigated constitutional provisions and “[n]early ninety percent of all contract clause cases in-
volved state-granted franchises, mainly corporate charters.” Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding
the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and
“Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.2, 7 (1986) (citing B. WRIGHT, THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 95, 101, 243 (1938)).
48. Id. at 36-54, 70-72. For an early case in which the Court strictly construed a corporate
charter, see Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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Campbell’s dissent arguing that the state’s power to tax was
inalienable and not “renounced in favor of chartered associations.”49
In the next couple of decades, the Court moved in the direction
suggested by the dissent, upholding state police power to regulate
corporations against Contract Clause claims,50 but it did not move
beyond conceptions of the corporation as an artificial entity repre-
senting an association or aggregate of investors.51 The Court also
reaffirmed, in Paul v. Virginia, its earlier conclusion from Bank of
Augusta that a corporation was not a citizen for purposes of the Ar-
ticle IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.52 Thus, on the whole, the
case law reflected a view of the corporation as an artificial entity
representing an association of individuals, and the Court used this
view in limited rulings to protect the contract and property interests
of the shareholders or members, whom it saw as the natural persons
composing the corporation.53
49. Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 370-80 (Campbell, J., dissenting); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1619-
20 (1988) (“It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case that the
most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created .... Every privilege
granted or right conferred ... being made inviolable by the Constitution, the government is
frequently found stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by unwise, careless
or corrupt legislation.” (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 335 (2d ed. 1871))); id. at 1635 (discussing “[t]he close connection between the rise of
the general corporation act and the subsequent judicial revolt against the special subsidy”).
50. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 329-30, 351-52, 355 (1886); Ruggles v.
Illinois, 108 U.S. 526, 533 (1883); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878);
Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1625-27 (discussing the decline of the Contract Clause doctrine
in the late nineteenth century); see also James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract
Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 376, 387-92 (2010).
51. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 73
(1992); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1630-32 (discussing the railroads’ arguments
in the 1870s Granger Cases based on the associational view of the corporation).
52. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181-82 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839).
53. A number of corporate law scholars have distinguished the “artificial entity” view of
corporations from the “association” view of corporations, however, our reading of nineteenth-
century cases is that the Court used both phrases, but did not intend to suggest that the
phrases represented different or inconsistent views. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Person-
ification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1449-50 n.23
(1987) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall’s use of the word “artificial” referred to the
“entity’s property-holding capacity” on behalf of investors, and characteristics such as
perpetual succession: “The natural way to hold property was as an individual human being;
the artificial way was as a corporation”).
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After the Civil War, in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted as one of three Reconstruction Amendments. Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the Privileges or Immunities,
Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses.54 The Court’s first
decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment raised important
questions regarding the aim of its protections and the scope of state
police power to regulate business.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court’s first major decision on
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court very narrowly interpreted
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.55 As a constitutional exercise
of state police power, the Court upheld a Louisiana law that con-
fined all slaughtering of animals in the New Orleans area to a spe-
cific slaughterhouse located south of the city limits.56 In so holding,
the Court stated that the new amendments should be interpreted in
light of the purpose of ensuring the freedom of African Americans,
and it narrowly read the Privileges or Immunities Clause to distin-
guish between the rights of state and national citizenship, finding
that the butchers’ claims opposing the state-created monopoly and
limits on their occupational practice were not within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Justice Field dissented, arguing for
a more expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment and criti-
cizing the majority for vitiating the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Separate dissents by Justices Bradley and Swayne argued
that the state regulation deprived the butchers of their property
rights without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
55. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 (1873).
56. Id. at 59-65.
57. Id. at 73-74. For a discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases, see Richard L. Aynes,
Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its
Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 297-300 (2006); David S. Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaugh-
ter-House: The Cases’ Support for Civil Rights, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1129, 1131-34 (2009);
Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1052-601 (2009); Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting
Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J.
643, 650-86 (2000).
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Amendment.58 In this early period after the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court also upheld, in Munn v. Illinois and
its companion Granger Cases, legislation that set maximum railroad
and grain storage rates.59 The Court relied again on the concept of
state police power to regulate conduct when necessary for the public
good.60
By the early to mid-1880s, Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad came to the Supreme Court raising the question of
whether a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.61 The case represented a group of similar
tax cases involving various railroad corporations, including a com-
panion case brought by San Mateo County against the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company.62 These cases all concerned whether a
provision of the California constitution violated the Fourteenth
58. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111-12 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at
126-28 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
59. 94 U.S. 113, 133-36 (1877). The Granger Cases included: Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S.
181 (1877); Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul R.R. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & North-western Railway, 94 U.S. 164
(1877); and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877).
60. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 133-36.
61. 118 U.S. 394, 410-17 (1886). Before Santa Clara, the Court had previously referred
to corporations as “artificial persons” and “associations of persons” as discussed above, and
had construed the term “person” in various statutes and treaties as including corporations.
See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876) (construing the term “person” as used
in the English Statute of Wills, and incorporated into New York state law, as including
corporations); United States v. Ins. Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99, 104 (1875) (construing a
statute that provided for suits by “persons” to recover proceeds from the sale of property
captured during the Civil War as including corporations); Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts v. Town of New-Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 489-92 (1823) (construing a
corporation as a “person” whose property was protected by the Treaty of Peace of 1783
between the United States and Great Britain). In several instances before Santa Clara, the
Court rejected corporate claims of equal protection and due process without addressing
whether corporations had such rights. Stone v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331,
335-36 (1886); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885); The Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115
U.S. 321, 328, 336 (1885); Chi. Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574, 579-84 (1884); The
Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1879); R.R. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 529 (1878).
62. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (including as defen-
dants the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the Northern Railroad Company, and the Cen-
tral Pacific Railroad Company); San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). These
cases are also known as the Railroad Tax Cases. For a detailed discussion of the history and
resolution of the Santa Clara and San Mateo cases, see HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S
CONSTITUTION 414-28 (1968); and Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the Corporate Person: How A Historical
Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201 (2014).
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by allowing all taxpayers
except “railroads and other quasi-public corporations” to deduct the
value of mortgages from their property tax assessment.63 The rail-
road corporations claimed this provision violated their equal protec-
tion rights and they refused to pay their tax bills, forcing various
counties to institute suits to recover the delinquent taxes and
enabling railroads to test the validity of their claims.64
As was customary for Supreme Court justices at the time, Justice
Field had traveled to his home state of California to hear cases in
the circuit court below, and his opinions provide useful insight into
views of corporations at the time. To start, in the Santa Clara
circuit opinion, Justice Field broadly interpreted Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and characterized corporations as associa-
tions. He explained that “private corporations consist of an associa-
tion of individuals united for some lawful purpose, and [are] permit-
ted to use a common name in their business and have succession of
membership without dissolution.”65 The individuals “do not, because
of such association, lose their rights to protection, and equality of
protection.”66 In Justice Field’s view, the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the property of persons—which he referred to as “members”
or “corporators”—who were “united” or “associated” together in a
“corporation” or “union.”67 That is:
[W]henever a provision of the constitution or of a law guaranties
to persons protection in their property, or affords to them the
means for its protection, or prohibits injurious legislation af-
fecting it, the benefits of the provision or law are extended to
63. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 404, 409 (emphasis omitted). At oral argument, counsel for
the railroads discussed that the United States government had invested $30 million in the
Central Pacific Railroad Company, and that the railroads, a “great national undertaking,”
provided the “one means of carrying on the interchange of military, postal, financial, civil and
commercial operations between the thirty-eight States of this Union from the shore of the
Atlantic to the tranquil Pacific.” Transcript of Oral Argument of Geo. F. Edmunds, Defendants
in Error at 10, 16, 18, Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394 (No. 464); see also Santa Clara, 18 F. at 387
(“It is contended that congress has selected these corporations as the special agents and
instruments of the nation for public purposes, and to that end has clothed them with faculties,
powers, and privileges to enable them to construct and maintain their roads as postal and
military roads of the government.”).
64. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 404, 409.
65. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 402.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 402-04. 
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corporations; not to the name under which different persons are
united, but to the individuals composing the union. The courts
will always look through the name to see and protect those
whom the name represents.68
This is because “to protect [corporations] from spoliation is to pro-
tect the corporators also.”69
Surely these great constitutional provisions, which have been,
not inaptly, termed a new Magna Charta, cannot be made to
read, as counsel contend, “nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, unless he
be associated with others in a corporation, nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
unless he be a member of a corporation.” How petty and narrow
would provisions thus limited appear in the fundamental law of
a great people!70
While characterizing corporations as associations, Justice Field
recognized the widespread use of corporations for business as well
as nonbusiness purposes, and noted the vast property aggregated
in manufacturing and other companies, and the large scale of rail-
road corporations in particular.71 He made particular note of the
miles of railway, the value of the roads, and the 1.6 million people
employed in the operation and construction of railroads.72 From this
observation, Justice Field commented that “all this vast property
which ... promotes civilization and progress” is not “lifted” from
68. Id. at 403.
69. Id. at 404.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 404-05 (including in his description of corporations “religious, educational, or
scientific” organizations, which most likely were nonprofit corporations, and noting extensive
amounts of property held in corporations).
72. Id. at 405. In his concurring opinion, Judge Sawyer referred more directly to the
plaintiff ’s argument, which is perhaps what spurred the Court’s reflection on the size and
wealth of the defendants:
Great stress was laid in the arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel upon the growing
and overweening power and greed of corporations; and it was vehemently
asserted that this is a struggle between the people and the corporations for
supremacy; that corporations by corrupt means, and through their large and
wide-spread influence, have obtained, and they are obtaining, control of legisla-
tures, etc.
Id. at 437 (Sawyer, J., concurring).
1692 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1673
“constitutional guaranties, by reason of the incorporation of the
companies; that is, because the persons composing them—amount-
ing in the aggregate to nearly half the entire population of the
country—have united themselves in that form under the law for the
convenience of business.”73
Likewise, in his related San Mateo circuit opinion, Justice Field
acknowledged the large scale of the railroad corporations before the
court, but maintained a characterization of corporations as associa-
tions of persons deserving equal protection of their property:
The questions ... received from the court the most patient and
thoughtful examination. Indeed, their examination has been
accompanied with a painful anxiety to reach a right conclusion,
aware as the court is of the opinion prevailing throughout the
community that the railroad corporations of the state, by means
of their great wealth and the numbers in their employ, have
become so powerful as to be disturbing influences in the admin-
istration of the laws .... Whatever acts may be imputed justly or
unjustly to the corporations, they are entitled when they enter
the tribunals of the nation to have the same justice meted out to
them which is meted out to the humblest citizen. There cannot
be one law for them and another law for others.74
Justice Field further explained: “Private corporations are, it
is true, artificial persons, but with the exception of a sole corpor-
ation, with which we are not concerned, they consist of aggrega-
tions of individuals united for some legitimate business.”75 Given
their widespread use for everything ranging from business to
charity, “[i]t would be a most singular result if a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial
and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert
such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a
73. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
74. San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 730 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
75. Id. at 743.
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corporation.”76 The Amendment protects “the property of the corpo-
rators.”77
Counsel for the defendant railroads also promoted the view of
corporations as associations in their briefs and oral arguments
before the Supreme Court and the circuit court below. For instance,
George Edmunds stated in oral argument for the railroads, “The
equality of protection is an equality of protection to men, whether
they are associated or dissociated.”78 Similarly, William Evarts, also
counsel for the defendant railroads, characterized the corporate
form as a way for natural persons to collectively hold property:
It is of no consequence whether the property ... is owned by a
firm, or by a joint association, or by a corporation, or by a man,
or by a hundred men ... because you have taken wholly from the
range of discussion and diversity from the State any opportunity
to make these discriminations.79
In the San Mateo case, John Norton Pomeroy wrote for the defen-
dant railroads: “The truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose
of protecting rights, the property of all business and trading cor-
porations is the property of the individual corporators.”80 These
formulations focused on protecting the property of the corporators
and treated “the corporation as a species of partnership.”81
76. Id. at 744. Likewise, Chief Judge Sawyer concurred in San Mateo, as he did in Santa
Clara, with a reference to corporations as “corporators ... united into an ideal legal entity” and
as an “artificial being between the real beneficial owners and the state, for the simple purpose
of convenient management of the business.” Id. at 757-58 (Sawyer, C.J., concurring). Chief
Judge Sawyer also relied on Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, asserting that the case had
settled “that the corporators are united into an ideal legal entity, called a corporation, [and
this] does not prevent them from having a right of property in the assets of the corporation
which is entitled to [constitutional protection].” Id.
77. Id. at 747 (majority opinion). Both Justice Field and Chief Judge Sawyer rejected
the suggestion in the Slaughter-House Cases that the protection afforded in the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to include only African Americans. Id. at 740-41; id. at 761
(Sawyer, C.J., concurring).
78. Transcript of Oral Argument of Geo. F. Edmunds, for Defendants in Error, supra note
63, at 14.
79. Transcript of Oral Argument of William M. Evarts, for Defendants in Error at 13,
Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (No. 464); see also id. at 17 (noting that corporations are “of
common right, by which all the people in California can aggregate themselves”).
80. San Mateo, 13 F. at 758 (Sawyer, C.J., concurring) (quoting John Norton Pomeroy for
defendants).
81. Mark, supra note 53, at 1442; see also HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 73 (“Up to the 1880s,
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When Santa Clara rose up to the Supreme Court on appeal, Chief
Justice Waite disposed of the railroads’ Fourteenth Amendment
claims in a comment made before oral argument:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these
corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.82
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
avoided ruling on the constitutional issue, instead taking a nar-
rower approach by finding that the tax assessment was void because
of a technical defect.83 Chief Justice Waite’s statement from the
bench was included only in the court reporter’s headnotes, which
lack the binding effect of the law.84
Nineteenth-century cases decided after Santa Clara do little to
further flesh out the Court’s view of the corporation, but what little
they do in this regard is consistent with an associational view. In
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
the Court held that corporations are not “citizens” for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.85
This holding followed from earlier cases concerning the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, such as Bank of Augusta v.
Earle and Paul v. Virginia.86 Nonetheless, the opinion noted as an
aside: “Under the designation of person [in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a
special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular
name, and have a succession of members without dissolution.”87 A
there was a strong tendency to analyze corporation law not very differently from the law of
partnership.”); id. at 90 (discussing Victor Morawetz’s 1882 A Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporations, which “treated corporations as virtually indistinguishable from partnerships”).
82. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396 (headnotes).
83. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1643.
84. See GRAHAM, supra note 62; Mark, supra note 53, at 1463-64; Pollman, supra note 83,
at 1643.
85. 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888). 
86. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 519, 581-82 (1839); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-35, 52.
87. Pembina Consol., 125 U.S. at 189; see Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 209
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year later in Minneapolis & St. Lewis Railroad v. Beckwith, the
Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection claims of a railroad corporation, but generally affirmed
“that corporations can invoke the benefits of provisions of the
constitution and laws which guaranty to persons the enjoyment of
property, or afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit
legislation injuriously affecting it.”88
We see from this history that the Court repeatedly treated corpo-
rations as artificial entities representing associations of individuals,
and found constitutional rights for corporations as derivative
rights—derived from the rights of natural persons behind the corpo-
ration. The other notable limit of these nineteenth-century cases is
the subject matter. These early cases recognizing corporations as
holders of constitutional rights, or “persons” under the Constitution,
responded to questions about whether corporations should have the
property and contract rights and protections afforded to individuals.
From Dartmouth College, involving the protection of a corporate
charter as a contract, to Santa Clara, involving the protection of the
property interests of railroad corporations, the context remained a
question of contract and property.89 Even the Court’s early case law
concerning diversity jurisdiction, at its core, represented a corpora-
tion attempting to vindicate a property right. The essential dispute
in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux was the bank’s challenge of
a Georgia statute that purported to tax the bank.90 The Supreme
Court itself characterized this line of cases as concerning “where
contracts or rights of property are to be enforced by or against
corporations.”91
(1888) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment claim of railroad company because “when legislation
applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not
open to the objection that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons
brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions”).
88. 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (citing Pembina Consol., 125 U.S. at 189; Santa Clara Cnty. v.
S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
89. See Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1641 (noting that the doctrine of corporate
personhood addressed the “problem [of] guaranteeing that the owners of property held in the
name of a corporation would receive the same constitutional protections as the owners of
property held in their own name”).
90. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 63 (1809).
91. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 177-78. Legal literature around this time also discussed the
case law as concerning property and contract rights. See GRIFFITH OGDEN ELLIS, QUESTIONS
ANSWERED AND DIFFICULTIES MET FOR STUDENTS OF LAW 40, 41 (1899) (noting that the word
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Further, when the Court made its Santa Clara ruling, the Four-
teenth Amendment had not yet been used to make provisions of the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states.92 Thus, the Court’s early
jurisprudence recognizing corporate property as having certain
constitutional protections was, at least in hindsight, relatively
modest in scope, even though some jurists and commentators ex-
pressed concern about privileges, monopolies, and growing concen-
trations of wealth.93 The case law “merely affirmed that corporate
property was protected as property of the corporators.”94 In addition,
certain constitutional protections had been refused to corpora-
tions—such as the protections of the privileges and immunities of
“citizens” under Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment—which
underscored that rights accorded to corporations were circum-
scribed.95 In short, by the late nineteenth century, the Court had
accorded certain constitutional protections to corporate property and
contracts, with a view toward protecting the persons associating
through the corporate form, but this protection was limited in scope.
In the next Part, we examine available data on the actual pop-
ulation of corporations in the United States between the early
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to make the case that the
Court’s use of an associational rationale in its treatment of corpora-
tions under the Constitution was reasonable until late in the nine-
teenth century. However, by the end of the century, much larger
corporations emerged, with features that could no longer support a
characterization as associations of identifiable people.
“person” in the Fourteenth Amendment, “for depriving a person of property,” applies to
corporations); Simeon E. Baldwin, Private Corporations, in TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1701-1901, at 261, 282 (1901) (“As holding the position of a citizen, while not
necessarily entitled to claim such political rights as those of suffrage or representation in the
legislature, the corporation may assert at least a prima facie title to the ordinary civil rights
of property and contract, belonging to the individual.”).
92. See Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1643.
93. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 47, at 57-66 (discussing the “central status” of private
property in the economic, political, and moral thought of nineteenth-century Americans, and
the contrasting concern with privilege and monopolies); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1985) (“The
Santa Clara decision was not thought of as an innovation but instead was regarded as
following a line of cases going back almost seventy years to the Dartmouth College case.”). 
94. See Mark, supra note 53, at 1463.
95. Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment
(Tobin Project Working Paper) (on file with authors). 
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II. CORPORATIONS IN EARLY AND PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA
The concept of a legal entity with existence separate from its
individual owners has existed for many centuries, with some schol-
ars tracing the roots of corporations to ancient Rome and medieval
and Renaissance Italy.96 Eighteenth-century Scottish writer Stewart
Kyd provided the classic definition of a corporation as “a collection
of many individuals, united into one body,” that has “perpetual
succession under an artificial form” and is “vested, by the policy of
the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an
individual, particularly of taking and granting property, contracting
obligations, and of suing and being sued.”97 As our focus is on the
history of corporations in the United States and their treatment
under the Constitution, we start with an examination of corpora-
tions in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America.98
A. Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century: Business
Corporations Before General Incorporation Acts
Typologies of corporations provide helpful insight into the popu-
lation of early American corporations. In 1828, jurist and legal
scholar James Kent, in his famous Commentaries on American Law,
observed that corporations were either “ecclesiastical” or “lay.”99 Ec-
clesiastical corporations were religious institutions, such as church-
es or monasteries, that possessed charters from the state enabling
them to hold property continuously over time, regardless of turnover
of the members or the people who managed the property. Lay
96. Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336
(2006); see also David F. Linowes, The Corporation as Citizen, in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 345, 345 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1992).
97. 1 STEWART KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 13 (Garland Publ’g, Inc.
1978) (1793) (emphasis omitted).
98. For a history of pre-nineteenth-century corporations, see generally 1-2 JOSEPH S.
DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS (Harvard Univ. Press 1917); Eric
Hilt & Jacqueline Valentine, Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New
York, 1791-1826, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 332 (2012); Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and
the State (Tobin Project Working Paper) (on file with authors).
99. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 221 (De Capo Press 1971) (1827).
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corporations were “again divided into eleemosynary and civil.”100
Eleemosynary corporations included hospitals, colleges and uni-
versities, or organizations that provided charitable services. Civil
corporations were “either public or private.”101 By public corpora-
tions, Kent meant entities that existed for “public political purposes
only, such as counties, cities, towns, and villages.”102 For these non-
business organizations, incorporation provided “a mechanism for
holding property for some public, charitable, educational, or
religious use,” in a way that promoted stability by keeping the insti-
tution’s property locked in and separate from that of its owners,
members, or managers.103
“Private” corporations were the only category of corporation that
could engage in commercial activity.104 In the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, such business corporations were still quite
rare—most businesses were organized either as individual propri-
etorships or as partnerships,105 and corporations required charters
issued by special acts of the state legislatures.106 Between 1781 and
1791, American states chartered only thirty-two business corpora-
tions.107 Most of these were created to provide transportation infra-
structure such as canals and bridges, and the rest included banks,
insurance companies, and manufacturing companies.108 This list
reflects how state legislatures often granted special charters to early
private corporations to serve quasi-public purposes, engaging in
100. Id. at 222.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 423-24 (2003); see Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 392-93 (2000).
104. See Blair, supra note 103, at 424.
105. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 36 (1977); Blair, supra note 103, at 394; Mark, supra note 53, at 1443-44
(“Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century business was generally conducted by single
proprietorships or partnerships rather than corporations.”).
106. GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1800-1943, at 10 (1948), available at http://perma.cc/B3UZ-SZGG (“[During] the first three-
quarters of the 19th century ... most incorporations were by special charter.”); see Hilt, supra
note 98 (explaining that American state legislatures initially chartered corporations
individually by special act).
107. Hilt, supra note 98, at 5-6.
108. Id.
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business while also providing a needed service to the public.109 For
example, a state legislature’s act providing a corporate charter to an
insurance company states that it would “ ‘alleviate the distress of,
and afford immediate relief to, sufferers’ from fire damage” and a
bank charter from the time states it “will probably be of great public
utility.”110
Notwithstanding the small number of charters and stated quasi-
public purposes, “the creation and regulation of business corpor-
ations were among the most contentious issues faced by the
American states,” inciting debate over whether they truly served the
public interest and whether they would corrupt politics or the
economy.111 The wealthy dominated stock ownership.112
In the decades after 1791, the rate at which businesses incorpo-
rated increased.113 Recent scholarship by Richard Sylla and Robert
Wright shows that by 1840, legislatures of various states had issued
9270 such special charters, although many of these apparently
never raised enough capital to begin operation.114
According to business historian Alfred Chandler, there were still
no “middle managers” in the organizational structures of business
corporations by the 1840s,115 and many businesses continued to be
small, single unit operations managed by the founder or his fam-
ily.116 That is not to say that all corporations were perceived as
small in the economic life of the time. Bank chartering was politi-
cally contentious, for example, and some banks were quite large
businesses for the era—the Bank of New York counted a number
of prominent politicians as shareholders and was founded with
109. Blair, supra note 103, at 424; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and
the Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture,
in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 29, 32-33 (Kenneth
Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004); see Hilt, supra note 98.
110. Hilt, supra note 98, at 6.
111. Id. at 1-5. 
112. Id. at 2, 8 (providing data showing the mean assessed wealth of New York
stockholders in 1791 and 1826 was nearly three times that of the general population).
113. See id.
114. Richard Sylla & Robert E. Wright, Corporation Formation in the Antebellum United
States in Comparative Context, 55 BUS. HIST. 653, 657 tbl.1 (2013).
115. CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 3.
116. Until the 1840s, “[i]n farming, lumbering, mining, manufacturing, and construction
the enterprise remained small and personal. In nearly all cases it was a family affair. When
it acquired a legal form, it was that of a partnership.” Id. at 50.
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$500,000 of capital.117 But as Joseph Sommer observed, banking
in the early nineteenth century still had the character of mer-
chants’ “[c]lub[s],” “credit union[s],” or “cooperative[s].”118 And as
Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler have recently shown,
many early corporations, such as turnpike and canal corporations,
represented local merchants and landowners pooling resources
to establish transportation infrastructure or a public utility from
which they would directly benefit as customers.119 Even though they
facilitated large aggregations of wealth and engendered political
controversy as a consequence, early corporations could thus be seen
as devices by which an identifiable group of persons could come
together to accomplish a specific project.
B. 1840-1895: Rapid Growth in the Use of Business Corporations
Use of the corporate form for businesses began growing rapidly in
the mid-nineteenth century, and this trend continued through the
later part of the century. Between 1840 and 1860, Sylla and Wright
count 13,149 more special charters issued by states, plus they
estimate that as many as 4000 more corporations had been chart-
ered without special legislative acts in states that had passed some
form of general incorporation statute.120
Such general incorporation statutes provided broader access to
the corporate form and eliminated the requirement of obtaining a
special act of the legislature, which had proven to be a system sus-
ceptible to corruption by political interests.121 The process of moving
to general incorporation took place in some states by amendments
to state constitutions, occurring in waves starting in the 1840s and
going until the turn of the century, by which time nearly all states
117. Hilt, supra note 98, at 23.
118. Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks,
Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1021, 1034-35 (2001).
119. Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 959-62, 966-67 (2014).
120. Sylla & Wright, supra note 114; see also EVANS, supra note 106, at 10 (identifying the
period from 1843 to 1861 as one of three “long waves of incorporation” in nineteenth-century
United States).
121. Jessica L. Hennessey & John Joseph Wallis, Corporations and Organizations in the
United States After 1840, at 3, 29 (Tobin Project Working Paper) (on file with authors) (discus-
sing how general incorporation laws provided an “economic solution to the political problem”
of antidemocratic corruption of corporate privileges given to special groups and elites).
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had general incorporation.122 According to historian Eric Hilt, “[A]s
the state government became more democratic, broader elements of
society were enabled to found business corporations, or invest in
those that were created. Shareholders and directors remained atypi-
cal of the population, but became less so over time as larger
numbers of corporations were created.”123 By far, the majority of the
newly formed corporations in the early to mid-nineteenth century
were either financial firms (banks and insurance companies), or
transportation firms (such as bridges, canals, roads, and the early
short-line railroads),124 and many of the transportation firms had
been financed at least partly with public money.125 Mining, utilities,
and manufacturing firms made up most of the rest.126 Many of these
corporations were still relatively small.127 Events of the time contin-
ued to reflect a complicated relationship between corporations and
the state. For example, some state governments had sovereign debt
crises resulting from defaults on borrowing that had been used to
invest in canals, railroads, and banks.128 In response, a dozen states
wrote new constitutions containing restrictions on public investment
in private corporations and adopting general incorporation acts.129
Railroads were the first large, modernized businesses in America.
The first railroad boom did not begin until the late 1840s and
122. Id. at 11 tbl.1.
123. Hilt, supra note 98, at 15.
124. Sylla & Wright, supra note 114, at 28; see also EVANS, supra note 106, at 20 tbl.11
(providing data by industry and decade on corporations chartered in Maryland, New Jersey,
New York, and Ohio). In the 1840s, manufacturing and mining firms represented more than
40 percent of incorporations in Maryland, New Jersey, and New York, and only about 5
percent of firms incorporated in Ohio. EVANS, supra note 106, at 20 tbl.11.
125. CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 34. Chandler reported that “[o]nly a small number of
American railroads were initially operated by the state,” but that “the charters of the early
roads generally provided for close legislative oversight of these new transportation enter-
prises.” Id. at 82. 
126. See Sylla & Wright, supra note 114, at 28.
127. Lamoreaux, supra note 109, at 34 (“[T]he vast majority of enterprises that took out
corporate charters were small and medium-sized firms.”). 
128. John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions?:
State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of
American Infrastructure, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUD-
GET POLICY 331, 344 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008).
129. Id. at 344-45; see also Thomas K. McCraw, American Capitalism, in CREATING
MODERN CAPITALISM: HOW ENTREPRENEURS, COMPANIES, AND COUNTRIES TRIUMPHED IN
THREE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS 303, 310 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1997).
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1850s.130 Before that time, railroads had not fundamentally changed
existing routes or modes of transportation, and had merely connec-
ted existing commercial centers and supplemented existing water
transportation.131 Railroad lines were rarely more than fifty miles
long.132 As railroad technology improved in the 1840s and 1850s, rail-
roads expanded and enjoyed commercial success. In the 1840s, over
6000 miles of railroads went into operation, and in the 1850s, over
21,000 more miles of railroad were constructed.133 The largest of the
railroads tapped into capital markets around the globe (especially
in England, France, and Germany) to finance their development,
mostly in the form of debt capital or bonds.134 By the early 1860s,
railroads in the United States were the largest business corpora-
tions and had grown tremendously, but were still fragmented and
had not yet come together into a well-integrated system.135 The
number and size of manufacturing and other industrial corporations
also grew in the 1860s to help provide supplies for the warring
armies during the Civil War, and although the war disrupted rail-
road construction in the South, it continued apace in the rest of the
country.136
Railroad corporations moved to the forefront of managerial inno-
vation as they confronted and dealt with the logistical complexities
they faced in coordinating the new volume of labor and business.137
Top managers of the hundreds of local and regional railroads
began meeting to coordinate the establishment of physical connec-
tions between the railroad tracks, uniform operating procedures,
and standardized technology to manage increased long-distance
130. CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 82.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 83; see also Jac C. Heckelman & John Joseph Wallis, Railroads and Property
Taxes, 34 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 77, 87 (1997) (providing nineteenth-century railroad
statistics).
134. See CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 91-92. Chandler estimated that railroads raised a
total of $700 million in investment capital in the 1850s and began tapping into capital
markets in France, Germany, and Britain. Id. at 90-91.
135. See id. at 122.
136. Evans documented an upsurge in incorporations in the 1860s, “after the outbreak of
hostilities” in the Civil War, and then “a decade of readjustment” when incorporations slowed
down in the 1870s. See EVANS, supra note 106, at 31.
137. See CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 81-121.
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traffic.138 By the 1880s, these gatherings morphed into over a dozen
different associations, representing specialized functions carried out
by railroad managers and employees, and frequently holding meet-
ings to discuss national standards for procedures and equipment.139
The activities of these associations led to changes in the design
and technology of trains, and the organization and administration
of railroad lines, that greatly improved productivity and through
traffic.140 But to a greater extent than previously experienced by any
industry, the railroads had high capital and other fixed costs rela-
tive to the total costs of providing services.141 Over time, these high
fixed costs encouraged individual railroads to try to cut rail rates to
attract traffic from competing lines.142 The resulting rate competi-
tion destroyed profits and led to attempts by competing rail lines to
try to collaborate with each other to control rates.143 Such efforts at
cooperation to control competition repeatedly failed, however, and
were subject to attack by farmers’ granges and merchants’ boards
of trade.144 This situation resulted in railroads, led by individuals,
such as Charles Crocker, Edward H. Harriman, Mark Hopkins,
Leland Stanford, Jay Gould, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, acquiring
and merging into huge systems that operated thousands of miles of
track.145
As for other types of business corporations, some corporations
had begun marketing their products across large stretches of the
country, making use of the new railroads to transport goods long
distances. During this period corporations began using brands to
138. See id. at 122-33.
139. See id. at 130-31 (listing the associations that helped to organize and standardize
railroad operations).
140. Id. at 132-33.
141. Id. at 134.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 134-37.
144. Id. at 141-42.
145. See id. at 134, 159-61, 167. By the 1870s and 1880s, local governments went through
a debt crisis, mostly over debts they had incurred to invest in public works projects and
railroads. See Wallis & Weingast, supra note 128, at 356-59. Some states instituted
restrictions forbidding local governments from investing in private corporations. Id. at 360.
These state and local government debt crises likely raised awareness of the large scale of
investment in corporations at the time, particularly railroads, the potential for corruption
these investments represented, and the critical importance of corporations for local
government infrastructure and investment.
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identify the source of their products and assure consumers of the
quality of the products carrying the brand.146
Despite the growth in the number and size of corporations, by
1880, Louis Galambos asserts that there were still “hardly any pri-
vate businesses” that rivaled the railroads in scale, in the sophisti-
cation of internal management systems, in the extent to which they
used capital raised from anonymous financial markets, or in the
extent to which they had a recognizable brand or otherwise had a
distinct identity that investors, employees, and customers were
likely to view as separate from the founders or founding families.147
Likewise, Morton Horwitz has stated, “Before 1890, only railroads
constituted ‘large, well-established, widely known enterprises with
securities traded on organized stock exchanges, while industrials,
though numerous, were small, scattered, closely owned, and com-
monly regarded as unstable.’ ”148
Although John D. Rockefeller was rapidly expanding Standard
Oil in the 1870s, it was not until 1882 that he converted his empire
from a loose coalition of individual closely held firms to the “trust”
form that effectively consolidated the operation and management of
these firms.149 Prior to being organized as a trust, Standard Oil was
initially perceived as an association of oil refiners, rather than as a
separate entity with a distinct identity. After the Sherman Antitrust
Act passed in 1890, Rockefeller and the other major investors in the
enterprise frequently tried to conceal the fact that the individual
corporations in the trust were managed in a highly coordinated way.
But it was not until 1899, after Rockefeller had officially retired,
that Standard Oil Company of New Jersey became the holding
company for the firms that had been part of the trust, so that the
146. Examples include Singer sewing machines and Ivory soap in the 1860s and 1870s. See
Blair, supra note 103, at 442-49.
147. LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940: A
QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 7 (1975); see also McCraw, supra note 129, at 320
(“Before the 1880s, even the largest manufacturing firms seldom had been capitalized at more
than $1 million.”).
148. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 209 (quoting Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise
of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 106 (1955)); see Leslie
Hannah, A Global Census of Corporations in 1910, at 3-4, 8 (CIRJE, Univ. of Tokyo & London
Sch. of Econ. Discussion Paper No. CIRJE-F-878, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/EQ3Y-
LKYY; see also Sylla & Wright, supra note 114.
149. GALAMBOS, supra note 147, at 7.
2015] CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1705
organization became a single giant corporation.150 Similarly, Andrew
Carnegie’s iron and steel interests had grown to substantial size by
1880, but continued to be organized as “closely owned partnerships”
until they converted in 1892 to the corporate form.151
Until at least the 1890s, therefore, the universe of corporations in
the United States consisted of a small number of very large railroad
firms, hundreds of smaller railroads that had yet to be consolidated
into smoothly functioning systems, other transportation and public
works firms serving localized markets and generally financed local-
ly, a few large firms in mining and manufacturing, a small number
of large banks, and tens of thousands of much smaller corporations,
in a whole range of industries, that were still closely held and oper-
ated much like partnerships.152 By 1890, corporations were just be-
ginning to emerge as powerful entities, independent of their
founding families or of the group of businessmen who consolidated
to form them.
Thus, it may have been a stretch, but not a great one, for the
Court to still regard the largest corporations of the time, such as the
railroads in the Santa Clara case, as associations of individuals.153
The Court likely continued this characterization because the largest
firms, following the path of the railroads, had in fact been formed by
the joining together of groups of smaller firms, and the combinations
150. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 44-47, 97-98
(1991).
151. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 210; see also GALAMBOS, supra note 147, at 7.
152. See EVANS, supra note 106, at 47, 48 tbl.16 (listing all corporations formed near the
end of the nineteenth century with more than $20 million in capitalization that were formed
in New Jersey, the “chief home of the large corporation in this period”). From 1846 through
1898, only twenty-five companies this large or larger were chartered in New Jersey, only five
of which were chartered before 1890, and four of these were railroads, transportation, or
public works firms. Then, in 1899, fifty such large corporations were chartered in New Jersey,
a large share of which were manufacturing or distribution companies. See id. 
153. The Southern Pacific Railroad and Central Pacific Railroad, defendants in the cases
that had been joined together in Santa Clara, were widely known to be controlled by a group
of four railroad barons, called The Big Four. They included Leland Stanford, Collis Potter
Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker. OSCAR LEWIS, THE BIG FOUR, at v (1938).
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Field, who is widely believed to have supported the position of
the railroads in this case, was a personal friend of these men. See TED NACE, GANGS OF
AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 89 (2003) (“Field
socialized with the railroad men, and when Leland Stanford organized Stanford University
he appointed Field as a trustee.”).
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did not initially have well-integrated, unified, and self-perpetuating
management structures.
By 1895, however, the great merger movement of the turn of the
century was beginning, and over the next ten years, modest-sized
corporations in dozens of industries would consolidate into very
large corporations with monopoly control, or near-monopoly control
over their markets.154 With the widespread increase in size, liq-
uidity, managerial hierarchy, dispersion of share ownership, and
branded identity of corporations that quickly developed during this
time, the landscape of corporations had truly changed. But by then,
the Supreme Court had already laid down some of the important
principles that would guide its decisions about the property and
contract protections of corporations and continue to shape the con-
stitutional treatment of corporations into the twenty-first century.
C. 1895-Early 1900s: Mergers and Consolidations and the Rise of
Modern Corporations
The transformation that occurred in business corporations in late
nineteenth-century America was nothing short of amazing. Histori-
ans Jessica Hennessey and John Wallis have put this transforma-
tion in context, explaining that although other large organizations
had historically existed, such as governments, armies, and churches,
“none of them reached the level of managerial sophistication and
close coordination of capital, labor, products, and markets of the late
19th century firms.”155
A merger movement took hold in the 1890s, by which a dynamic
played out in dozens of industries that followed the general pattern
of the earlier railroad mergers.156 Firms that operated only one, or
154. EVANS, supra note 106, at 47-49; see NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904, at 1-2 (1985). Morton Horwitz regards the
merger movement as the third of “three stages in the efforts of corporations to achieve
consolidation”: the first being the “pool” or “ ‘loose’ form of agreement employed by railroads,
beginning in the 1870s, to fix rates and regulate traffic,” the second being the creation of
“trust[s]” or holding companies, and the third being the “merger movement of 1898-1903.”
Horwitz, supra note 93, at 198-99.
155. Hennessey & Wallis, supra note 121, at 1. Alfred Chandler observed that “the Ameri-
can businessman of 1840 would find the environment of fifteenth-century Italy more familiar
than that of his own nation seventy years later.” CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 455.
156. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 154, at 1; see also CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 320-39.
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a few facilities, built new factories that incorporated mass-produc-
tion technology, and expanded rapidly to serve the growing consum-
er market.157 Many firms then found themselves with substantial
excess capacity during the depression of 1893, and had strong
incentives to cut prices to try to keep their plants operating at high
levels of throughput.158 The result was ruinous competition that
threatened to bankrupt hundreds of medium-sized firms.159 Faced
with such competitive pressures, firms tried to organize themselves
into cartels to keep prices from collapsing, but the cartels were
unsustainable. And in any case, Congress made such collaborative
activities illegal in 1890 with the Sherman Antitrust Act.160 So in
industry after industry, leading business people sought help from
law firms to consolidate, and from 1895 to 1904, huge numbers of
small- to medium-sized corporations merged into very large corpor-
ations with monopolies or near-monopolies in their industries.161
Despite the large size of corporations that resulted from these
consolidations, the Supreme Court may have continued to regard
them as associations, at least in the early years after the merger
movement, because they had been formed from groups of smaller,
closely held firms, often owned by or closely identified with some
entrepreneur or family, that had joined together to try to solve a
common problem. In fact, most of the big consolidations were formed
from groups of five or more smaller firms that were still identified
with their founders or a founding family that held most of the
stock.162
From the 1890s, however, other changes in the population of
corporations were taking place that were at odds with the idea that
business corporations were just associations of people. State laws
changed to facilitate mergers by permitting corporations to hold
stock in other corporations and to enter into consolidation agree-
ments on the basis of approval by a majority of shareholders, rather
than unanimous approval of shareholders.163 Corporations were also
157. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 154, at 12.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 14.
160. HARLAND PRECHEL, BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE 61-62 (2000).
161. LAMOREAUX, supra note 154, at 2 (“[M]ore than half of the consolidations absorbed
over 40 percent of their industries, and nearly a third absorbed in excess of 70 percent.”).
162. See id. at 1 n.1.
163. See Horwitz, supra note 93, at 201-03; see also PRECHEL, supra note 160, at 32-41
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increasingly run by boards of directors, or professional managers,
instead of by the founders, or the shareholders themselves.164 As
Chandler famously observed, “The visible hand of managerial direc-
tion had replaced the invisible hand of market forces in coordinating
the flow of goods from the suppliers of raw and semifinished
materials to the retailer and ultimate consumer.”165 And after 1890,
“industrials began to be listed on the Stock Exchange and to be
traded by leading brokerage houses.”166 By this time, a “number of
industrial enterprises were beginning to serve the entire nation,”
and by the turn of the century, “the names of many integrated,
multifunctional enterprises had become household words.”167 In-
deed, with the rise of mass retailers, mail-order houses, and chain
stores, came the rise of complementary businesses like advertising
agencies that began to have a national scope.168 One of the impor-
tant functions of these advertising agencies was to create and
maintain branded identities for corporations that were distinct from
the business people who founded, owned stock, or worked in the
corporations. The corporate form thus became the dominant way to
organize large-scale business of a type that had never been seen
before.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S TWENTIETH-CENTURY CORPORATE
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE AND APPROACH TO THE RISE OF MODERN
CORPORATIONS
In this Part, we bring our examination of corporate history and
the Supreme Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence through the
twentieth century and to recent cases. How did the rise of the mod-
ern business corporation undermine the idea that corporations were
just associations of people? Did the Court address in its constitu-
tional rights jurisprudence the transformation that occurred in the
types of corporations in existence? Did the Court characterize or
(discussing liberalization of state corporate laws); Lamoreaux, supra note 109, at 48 (“[T]he
new laws made possible the formation of businesses operating on an unprecedented scale.”).
164. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 214-16.
165. CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 286.
166. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 210.
167. CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 288-89.
168. See id. at 224-35, 290.
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treat corporations in a way that reflects the role and function they
have come to play in the contemporary era?
A. Giant Corporations Emerge
By 1910, the U.S. economy had come to be dominated by hun-
dreds of very large corporations. The transition was extraordinary.
As of 1898, historian David Bunting estimates, only about 300
business corporations in the United States had more than $1 million
in capital.169 By 1904, he estimates that some 3000 corporations
could meet this size test.170 Most of these corporations had been
formed through the industry-by-industry combinations of dozens
of smaller corporations during the great merger movement, so
these corporations were not just large, they also had near monopoly
control, or at least oligopoly control, over their industries.171 The
one hundred largest industrial corporations together accounted for
about 30 percent of all industrial capital in the United States in
the early twentieth century, according to Bunting’s calculations.172
These corporations included names we still recognize today: U.S.
Steel, Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon), National Biscuit Co.
(Nabisco), E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder (DuPont), and General
Electric.173 By 1901, “the nation’s railroads had been combined into
seven large rail systems.”174
The new giant corporations were not just larger than corporations
had been in the nineteenth century, they were in many ways, qual-
itatively different. They were no longer likely to be controlled by the
founder or family of the founder, but were likely to have hundreds,
or even thousands of shareholders, who traded their shares in public
securities markets,175 and hundreds or thousands of employees.176
169. DAVID G. BUNTING, THE RISE OF LARGE AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, 1889-1919, at 13,
70 tbl.8 (1986).
170. Id. Another study found that between 1895 and 1919, 4628 firms disappeared by being
merged into corporations capitalized at more than $1 million. Id. at 36.
171. See id. at 30 tbl.3.
172. Id. at 4.
173. For a list of the one hundred largest industrial corporations in the United States in
1905, see BUNTING, supra note 169, at 165-66 tbl.17.
174. Id. at 48.
175. See Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial
Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 130, 133 (1955).
176. See CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 3.
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They also increasingly had professional management.177 The leaders
of these modern corporations were consciously creating bureaucratic
structures so that the management systems could operate more or
less independently of who filled what roles in the system.178 “Bu-
reaucracies place emphasis on impersonal decisions made by a staff
of experts filling positions which, theoretically at least, do not
change when the personnel does,” Galambos observed.179 “Men fill
these positions on the basis of explicit technical qualifications, and
in a normal career they advance in regular steps within the organi-
zation.”180
The managers of these corporations were also working to estab-
lish branded identities that were deliberately separate from, and not
tied to, any particular director, founder, manager, or other leader in
the organization. These managers gave the corporations names that
were less likely to be linked to individual founders, and more likely
to suggest that they had a dominant position in their markets:
American Can, Standard Oil, Continental Tobacco, General Chem-
ical, and Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company.181
The size and impersonal nature of modern corporations made
them, to some extent, objects of fear and suspicion on the part of the
consumers of their products, as well as by other business people.
Thomas W. Lawson, a “broker, banker, and corporation man” by his
own description, said in 1906:
During the last twenty years there has grown up in this country
a set of colossal corporations in which unmeasured success and
continued immunity from punishment have bred an insolent
disregard of law, of common morality, and of public and private
right, together with a grim determination to hold on to, at all
hazards, the great possessions they have gulped or captured.182
Although modern corporations often had the ability to manipulate
markets and prices, squeeze out competitors, cheat their investors,
177. See id. at 3-4.
178. See id. at 8.
179. GALAMBOS, supra note 147, at 4.
180. Id.
181. See CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 234, 321, 355, 357, 387, 415-16.
182. BUNTING, supra note 169, at 3 (quoting THOMAS W. LAWSON, FRENZIED FINANCE: THE
CRIME OF AMALGAMATED 6-8 (William Heinemann ed., 1906)).
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and oppress their workers, they also, as they do today, help bring
the benefits of efficiencies in production and distribution to the
masses. As a consequence, public attitudes toward corporations
adapted and softened over the first few decades of the twentieth
century.183 Middle-class people became the managers and workers
in these corporations, the consumers of their goods, and the invest-
ors in their shares.184 Herman Thomas Warshow reported that the
number of individuals who owned corporate stock rose from 4.4
million in 1900 to 14.4 million in 1922.185 His analysis of income tax
returns from 1916 through 1922 also showed that a growing share
of individuals of relatively modest income reported income from
dividends during this period.186 “The largest and most significant
increase in dividends received has taken place in the class of
incomes below $5,000 per annum [equivalent to about $71,000
in 2014 dollars], in the group which includes the ‘wage-earning
class,’ ” Warshow reports.187
These developments likely changed the image that most people
had about what corporations were, and what they did. Galambos’s
extensive study of opinions about large corporations and their role
in the economy among the middle classes shows a very complex
evolution of public opinion, but concludes that by 1919:
[M]iddle-class Americans found new ways to talk and think
about corporate enterprise. Increasingly, they bought goods from
companies, not octopuses; they worked for firms, not trusts. By
1919 they viewed these businesses in a relatively impersonal
light. In the previous generation many citizens had been upset
not just with big business but with Gould and Vanderbilt. After
1902, they focused on J. P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and John
D. Rockefeller, but they still felt that behind the office doors of
the largest companies there were real, live men who were, for
better or for worse, deciding what should be produced, where it
183. See GALAMBOS, supra note 147, at 117.
184. See H. T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 39
Q. J. ECON. 15, 20-21 (1925).
185. Id. at 16.
186. See id. at 18 tbl.1.
187. Id. at 20. There are problems with this finding because Warshow grouped taxpayers
by nominal income, unadjusted for inflation, rather than by income percentile. Without
having access to the details behind Table 1, it appears that the trend he identifies in the data
would probably still be there if the data were properly adjusted.
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should be manufactured, and how much it should be sold for. If
Americans were upset with the trusts, they could locate their
enemy and perhaps (via the Clayton Act) even punish him for
his wrongdoing. During the First World War, however, public
attention drifted away from the plutocrats and empire builders
who had personalized the corporation.... From the First World
War on, Americans increasingly looked upon the corporation as
an impersonal bureaucracy beyond the control of any one man.188
By the middle of the twentieth century, what had emerged to
dominate the U.S. economy and imagination was, as Galambos tells
us, “a new culture, a corporate culture, which included, ... a new
public image of the giant corporation.”189 Although people were
generally concerned about the possibility of abuse of power, they
also found that “the bureaucratized corporation shared many values
with the middle-class reformers who led the progressive movement
in state and national politics.”190
It is important to keep in mind, however, that discussions about
the nature and function of corporations, and concerns about the
impact of corporations on public policy, often treat “corporations” as
synonymous with “big business.” To be sure, the new entities that
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and shaped thinking
about corporations through most of the twentieth century were
indeed very big businesses,191 as we have discussed. But in addition
to big corporations, there have always been small, closely held
business corporations, and numerous other types of organizations,
such as nonprofits, cooperatives, and membership organizations, all
organized using the corporate form. Our discussion is intended to
underscore this diversity of uses of the corporate form, which
increased with the rise of large, modern business corporations.
188. GALAMBOS, supra note 147, at 261.
189. Id. at 15.
190. Id. at 18.
191. See CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 3.
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B. Corporate Criminal Liability, Related Protections, and Other
Early Twentieth-Century Legal Developments
While the early twentieth century brought the emergence of large,
widely held business corporations in many industries, in the legal
world the early twentieth century ushered in Progressive Era
regulation,192 and a period in American legal history known as the
Lochner Era.193 During this period, the Court used the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the basis for
protecting substantive economic liberty and struck down regulations
that it viewed as interfering with this liberty.194 Two notable devel-
opments arose in this time concerning the history of corporate
rights: Congress enacted the first federal campaign finance law with
the Tillman Act of 1907, and the Court recognized corporations as
subject to corporate criminal liability and as holders of certain
related protections.
The Tillman Act, which banned corporations from spending
money “in connection with” any federal election, came in response
to a public call for reform.195 Public concern arose in the 1890s when
corporations began contributing significant amounts to political
candidates and parties.196 Momentum for reform gained steam when
President Theodore Roosevelt was charged with accepting large
corporate contributions in his 1904 presidential election, and shortly
after, when newspaper headlines exposed life insurance company
192. See, e.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (describing turn-of-the-
century regulation such as the “Sherman Law,” which “was a response to the felt threat to
economic freedom created by enormous industrial combines,” and the income tax law of 1894,
which “reflected congressional concern over the growing disparity of income between the many
and the few”).
193. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive
Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 754 n.16 (2009)
(noting various definitions for the Lochner Era, including “the period from 1900 until World
War I” and “the period from1890 until 1937”).
194. For examples from the voluminous historical and legal literature discussing the
Lochner Era, see Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 881, 881-83 (2005); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873-75 (1987).
195. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864; see also UAW, 352 U.S. at 570-77
(discussing the Tillman Act and its genesis). 
196. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 881 (2004).
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executives who had used corporate funds for self-serving political
contributions.197 Rhetoric concerning this scandal and the need for
campaign finance regulation relied, in part, on an associational view
of the corporation, seeing the harm as one not only to the public and
democracy generally,198 but also to shareholders of the corporation
in particular.199 In calling for the Tillman Act, President Theodore
Roosevelt told Congress: “All contributions by corporations to any
political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden
by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money
for such purposes.”200
This version of the associational view reflects the separation
of ownership and control that was already well underway at the
time.201 It sees the corporate property as that of the shareholders
and not that of a distinct entity, but it sees the corporation as, in
effect, representing shareholders and managers with potentially
divergent interests. Also notable is that politicians and others used
197. See id. at 886-93.
198. See, e.g., UAW, 352 U.S. at 570 (noting there “was popular feeling that aggregated
capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption” and, which
historians have noted, “threatened to undermine the political integrity of the Republic”)
(quoting SAMUEL E. MORRISON & HENRY S. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 355 (Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 1950)); id. at 576-77 (quoting one of the Senate
leaders debating passage of the Tillman Act who referred to “business interests and certain
organizations” as “associations of individuals” when discussing political contributions to
candidates and the corrupting effect that “is harmful to the general public interest”).
199. See Winkler, supra note 196, at 873 (“At the turn of the century, when Congress and
the states first adopted bans, corporate political contributions were also understood to be
corrupt because they amounted to a misuse of ‘other people’s money’: company executives
were opportunistically misappropriating the company owners’ money to purchase legislation
benefiting the executives themselves.”).
200. UAW, 352 U.S. at 572 (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)); see also Winkler, supra note
196, at 919-23 (discussing possible political motivations behind President Roosevelt’s support
of the Tillman Act and the shareholder protection rationale).
201. See, e.g., NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND 135-36 (1997) (discussing how
many nineteenth-century banks had a dominant management group that also held a
substantial share of the stock, even though there was also a wider network of passive
shareholders); Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control?: Corporate Gover-
nance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 645, 649-50 (2008); Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority
Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM:
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 126, 127-28 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia
Goldin eds., 2006) (discussing the growing number of corporations between the Civil War and
the Great Depression and the problem of minority shareholders).
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the associational view to support regulating corporations, whereas
the Court had previously used it as a rationale for extending protec-
tions to corporations.202
The other notable legal development in the early twentieth cen-
tury was that the Court definitively recognized corporate criminal
liability. Early common law had not held corporations subject to
criminal liability because of the conceptual difficulty in attributing
an act and intent to a corporation.203 By the early twentieth century,
however, lower courts began importing tort and agency principles
to hold corporations vicariously liable for criminal acts performed by
corporate agents.204 In addition, federal regulation of economic activ-
ity through criminal statutes, such as antitrust laws, had grown by
this time and raised issues concerning the government’s power to
prosecute corporations.205
In its landmark decision New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad v. United States, in 1909, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that a corporation could be held criminally liable for acts
by its agents.206 The case concerned the constitutionality of the
Elkins Act, which provided that a common carrier was subject to
criminal liability for the acts of its officers, agents, and employees
in offering illegal rebates.207 Counsel for the defendant railroad ar-
gued that the Elkins Act was unconstitutional because levying a
202. See Winkler, supra note 196, at 875 (discussing how the separation of ownership and
control contributed to concern about opportunism in corporations, particularly that “owners
were forced into unwanted political associations”).
203. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 481, 492 (1909)
(citing Chief Justice Holt and Blackstone and explaining that early common law held that a
corporation could not commit a crime in its corporate capacity); see also Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393,
396-400, 404-15 (1982) (discussing the history of corporate criminal liability in England and
America).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Van Shaick, 134 F. 592, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); United States
v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1898); see also Brickey, supra note 203, at 404-15.
Note that this analysis signaled a shift in thinking because it saw corporate officers as agents
not of the shareholders, but of the corporation, a separate entity. If the Court had seen
corporate officers and directors as agents of shareholders, then one would expect the share-
holders to be held vicariously liable. 
205. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions,
63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 814-16 (1996).
206. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R., 212 U.S. at 481.
207. See id. at 482-83.
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fine on a corporation for the acts of its employees amounted to
taking money from innocent shareholders without due process of
law.208 This argument looked through the corporation to its share-
holders. In establishing corporate criminal liability, the Court did
not ground the development in a theory of the corporation, however,
but rather turned to public policy, explaining:
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public
policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction, and
can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held
punishable by fine .... While the law should have regard to the
rights of all, and to those of corporations no less than to those of
individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great
majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted
through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce
is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity
from all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine
that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take
away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter
and correcting the abuses aimed at.209
Corporate criminal liability was a significant development in the
law, but the Court’s lack of theoretical grounding gave it an ad hoc
quality.
In the 1906 case Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that corporations
enjoy Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search-
es and seizures but may not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.210 In extending Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to corporations, the Court followed its pattern of using an
associational view of the corporation. The Court explained that a
corporation receives Fourth Amendment protection because it “is,
after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name
and with a distinct legal entity.”211 When individuals organize “as a
collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate
to such body.”212 For example, the Court noted that a corporation’s
208. See id. at 492.
209. Id. at 495-96.
210. 201 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1906).
211. Id. at 76.
212. Id.
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property cannot be taken without compensation and a corporation
is entitled to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.213
But the Court ruled that a corporation cannot claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because that
right “is purely a personal privilege of the witness.”214 The Court
explained that the privilege against self-incrimination operates
only when a witness is asked to incriminate himself, not a third
party, including the corporation for which an agent acts.215 This
reasoning emphasized the individual nature of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the separate legal identity of the corporation.
The Court further bolstered its conclusion by emphasizing the
artificial nature of the corporation as a legal creation under state
law and the state’s need to oversee corporations:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the
laws of the state and the limitations of its charter.... It would be
a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the
exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had
been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand
the production of the corporate books and papers for that
purpose.216
This explanation introduced an element of inconsistency into the
Court’s analysis as it is not clear why the need to inquire into corp-
orations would justify denying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to corporations but not also Fourth Amendment protections.
In sum, this early twentieth-century case law examining the
corporate criminal liability of corporations and related rights at
times persisted with views of the corporation as an artificial entity
or a concession of the state representing an association of individu-
als, but it also demonstrated a growing difficulty in using these
views consistently and doing so with a changing population of
213. See id.
214. Id. at 69.
215. Id. at 69-70.
216. Id. at 74-75.
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corporations and corresponding societal needs. Furthermore, it is
notable that in extending Fourth Amendment rights, the Court
moved into a new area of constitutional protection for corpora-
tions—one arguably beyond contract and property interests—and it
did not stop to explain whether the associational view still fit this
purpose, who was included in this characterization, and whether it
appropriately described the corporations involved in the underlying
matter.
After this early twentieth-century case law, the Court continued
to extend protections to corporations on a variety of bases and
sometimes without explanation.217 The Court eventually reversed
course on its rulings from the Lochner Era,218 but the Court did not
revisit its ruling on Fourteenth Amendment personhood for corpora-
tions that had been attributed to Santa Clara.219 The Court further
clarified, and in some instances expanded, corporate rights related
to searches and trials.220 And later in the twentieth century, the
217. Pollman, supra note 83, at 1655-58.
218. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling a liberty of
contract decision, Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613, 622-25 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the Court’s move
away from its Lochner Era decisions).
219. Pollman, supra note 83, at 1652-54 (discussing how the Court did not reconsider its
treatment of corporations as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment despite notable
dissents from Justice Black in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S.
77 (1938), and Justice Douglas in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949)).
220. The Court has clarified that Fourth Amendment protections for corporations are not
coextensive in scope with that of individuals. E.g., Henning, supra note 205, at 797; see Okla.
Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946) (“[C]orporations are not entitled to all
of the constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related mat-
ters.”); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315-20 (1978) (concluding that a
corporation had some expectation of privacy prohibiting warrantless searches to inspect
workplace safety, but that the standard for obtaining a warrant to enter a business was lower
than that to search a private home). Further, the Court has assumed that corporations can
claim the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and has seemingly recognized that
corporations have Sixth and Seventh Amendment entitlements to trial by jury in at least
some contexts. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1977) (dis-
cussing double jeopardy); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 141-43 (1962); V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477,
1517 n.211 (1996); see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-34 (1970) (holding “that the
[Seventh Amendment] right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to
which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury”
and noting that “a corporation’s suit to enforce a legal right was an action at common law
carrying the right to jury trial at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted”); see also S.
Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349-50 (2012) (recognizing a corporation as
2015] CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1719
Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment as protecting cor-
porate speech and political spending. This more recent period put in
sharp relief the Court’s unarticulated framework of corporate rights
as derivative and instrumental, as well as its failure to take account
of the differences among different types of corporations.
C. Corporate Rights Jurisprudence on the First Amendment
With limited exception, the question of whether the First Amend-
ment protects corporate commercial speech and political spending
did not arise until the 1970s. Previously, governments had regu-
lated without serious restriction corporate advertising, mailings,
and political spending.221 First Amendment protections had been
extended to corporations primarily in the narrow context of media
corporations and claims brought by the NAACP in the civil rights
era.222
The commercial speech doctrine started in the 1976 case Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, in which the Court ruled that the State
of Virginia could not forbid pharmacists from advertising drug
prices.223 Consumer advocates brought the case, arguing that the
First Amendment entitles consumers to receive information that
having a Sixth Amendment Apprendi right to jury determination of any fact that increases
a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence, other than the fact of a prior conviction);
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 823, 826-27 (1994) (recognizing a union’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding).
221. Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253 (David
Kairys ed., 1982); see also Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2586-87, 2642 (2008).
222. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (validating the NAACP’s claim that
a state statutory ban on improper solicitation of legal business abridged “the freedoms of the
First Amendment, protected against state action by the Fourteenth”); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that state-compelled disclosure of the group’s membership
list was invalid as restraining the members’ freedom of association); Grosjean v. Am. Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a state license tax imposed on
newspaper corporations selling advertising as an impermissible abridgment of speech or of
the press under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
223. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749-
70 (1976). Commercial speech has not been clearly defined, but has been generally understood
as speech promoting a commercial activity, product, or service, such as television advertising
or marketing. Piety, supra note 221, at 2593-95, 2644; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (describing commercial speech
as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).
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pharmacists might advertise about the price of drugs.224 The State
argued that the advertising ban served the public interest by
helping to avoid aggressive price competition among pharmacists
that might lead to a reduction in the professional services provided
by pharmacists to consumers.225 The Court sided with the consumer
advocates, holding that advertising is within the scope of First
Amendment protection because of the consumers’ interest in the
free flow of commercial information.226 The Court’s rationale relied
on the idea that consumers had a right to hear the information;
suppression of truthful speech about lawful activity could hurt con-
sumers and their ability to make informed decisions in our “free
enterprise economy.”227
The Court continued to develop the commercial speech doctrine
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services Commis-
sion of New York, in which it held that a state could not completely
ban promotional advertising by an electrical utility.228 The Court
explained that the First Amendment protects commercial speech—
“that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience”—from unwarranted governmental regula-
tion.229 The Court set out a four-part test for considering questions
of commercial speech: whether the speech concerns lawful activity
and is not misleading, whether the government has a substantial
interest in regulating the speech, whether the regulation directly
advances that governmental interest, and whether it has a reason-
able fit in serving that interest.230 As the Court continued to premise
the commercial speech doctrine on protecting the listener rather
224. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753-54.
225. Id. at 757-68.
226. Id. at 763-64.
227. Id. at 763-65.
228. 447 U.S. at 571-72.
229. Id. at 561.
230. Id. at 566; see Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (refining the last part of the
analysis to require a “reasonable fit,” rather than the least restrictive means); see also 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (establishing a heightened form
of First Amendment scrutiny for regulation creating a blanket ban on truthful, nonmisleading
speech about a lawful product and when the ban serves an interest unrelated to consumer
protection). For a discussion of more recent commercial speech case law, see TAMARA R. PIETY,
BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17-30 (2012), and the Case Western Reserve Law Review
Symposium, Nike v. Kasky and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 965 (2004).
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than the speaker, the Court did not examine whether this extension
of First Amendment protection to corporate speech treats corpora-
tions as having interests in self-expression and, if so, from whom
such autonomy interests would originate in corporations of different
types.
Like the commercial speech doctrine, the Court’s jurisprudence on
corporate political spending also began in the 1970s. The first of
such decisions came shortly after the Court’s landmark campaign
finance decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which equated political spend-
ing with political speech and interpreted the First Amendment as
a limit on campaign finance regulation.231 In First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, the Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts
law that barred banks and corporations from spending money to
influence ballot initiatives.232 Specifically, the state statute at issue
prohibited banks and business corporations from making expendi-
tures to influence the vote on referendum proposals on any question
submitted to voters “other than one materially affecting the
property, business or assets of the corporation.”233 The Court held
that by prohibiting such corporate expenditures, the statute
“abridge[d] expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect” and the corporate identity of the speaker did not deprive
the speech its protections.234
In its reasoning, the Bellotti Court first rejected an argument
that corporations do not have a right to liberty under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the means by which the First Amendment is
applicable to the states.235 The Court simply cited the 1886 Santa
Clara case in a footnote, and a string citation to the limited me-
dia corporation cases.236 Next, the Court labeled the “materially
231. 424 U.S. 1, 39, 143 (1976). Scholars and jurists have argued that while spending
money may facilitate speech or amplify its volume, the restriction of spending should not be
equated with the restriction of speech. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t
Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 962-63 (2011); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:
Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004-05 (1976); see also Jessica Levinson, The Original
Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 882-
83 (2013).
232. 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). Under Bellotti, laws burdening corporate political spending
are subject to strict scrutiny, a higher standard than commercial speech. Id. at 786-89.
233. Id. at 767-68. 
234. Id. at 776.
235. Id. at 778-79.
236. Id. at 780 n.15.
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affecting” requirement of the statute an impermissible subject-based
speech prohibition.237 The Court then explained that the State failed
to show a compelling interest to justify the prohibition.238 According
to the Court, the State did not show “that the relative voice of
corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influenc-
ing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat
to the confidence of the citizenry in government,” and because refer-
enda are held on issues, not candidates, the risk of corruption was
not present.239 Further, the Court reasoned that the statute’s under-
and over-inclusiveness undermined the State’s argument that
shareholder protection was a compelling interest: “Ultimately share-
holders may decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy,
whether their corporation should engage in debate on public
issues.”240
Notably, the Court’s decision failed to consider the importance of
who the speaker is and on what basis a corporation would hold a
right and be considered a speaker. In so doing, the Court avoided
identifying the source of the First Amendment value when a corpo-
ration spends from its treasury, and whether that logic would apply
to all corporations. Its reliance on the notion of “corporate democ-
racy” avoids engaging with the questions of whether and how people
interact and express their voices in or through different kinds of
corporations. In this way, the Court failed to recognize the reality
of modern corporations, in which shareholders often own stock only
indirectly through mutual funds or other institutional investors and
are frequently rationally apathetic, without information or a voice
in the corporation.241 Furthermore, the stock ownership of modern,
publicly traded corporations changes minute by minute and it is
impossible to pinpoint a fixed group of individuals for whom the
corporation would be speaking.
237. Id. at 784.
238. Id. at 786-95.
239. Id. at 789-90.
240. Id. at 794.
241. See Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness
in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009), http://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/citizens-not-united-the-lack-of-stockholder-voluntariness-in-corporate-po
litical-speech [http://perma.cc/5NWZ-7KGP] (explaining how the procedures of “corporate
democracy” offer little to no relief for dissenting shareholders).
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The Bellotti dissents are more consistent with the logic of earlier
Supreme Court jurisprudence than is the majority opinion, and the
dissents also take more account of modern corporations. Justice
White dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, to criti-
cize the majority for “substitut[ing] its judgment as to the proper
balance [between competing First Amendment interests] for that of
Massachusetts.”242
Undoubtedly, as this Court has recognized, see NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), there are some corporations formed
for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes
shared by all their members, or, as in the case of the press, of
disseminating information and ideas. Under such circumstances,
association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a
means of achieving effective self-expression. But this is hardly
the case generally with corporations operated for the purpose of
making profits. Shareholders in such entities do not share a
common set of political or social views, and they certainly have
not invested their money for the purpose of advancing political
or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the business of
disseminating news and opinion.243
Justice White argued that although “it may be assumed that
corporate investors are united by a desire to make money” and
commercial speech has some First Amendment protection, “[t]his
unanimity of purpose breaks down ... when corporations make
expenditures ... designed to influence the opinion or votes of the
general public on political and social issues that have no material
connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets.”244
Accordingly, “there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these
views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their sharehold-
ers.”245 In fact, the statute supported the First Amendment value of
not forcing individuals to associate with beliefs with which they
disagree.246 Further, the state statute would not impinge on listen-
ers’ First Amendment interests because corporate political spending
242. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 805.
244. Id. at 805-06.
245. Id. at 806.
246. Id. at 812.
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“lack[s] ... connection with individual self-expression” and it would
still leave individuals composing the corporation “free to communi-
cate their thoughts,” even by “form[ing] associations for the very
purpose of promoting political or ideological causes.”247
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Bellotti pointed out that shortly
after the Court decided that a corporation is a “person” entitled to
protection under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded “that
the liberty protected by that Amendment ‘is the liberty of natural,
not artificial persons.’ ”248 The only departures had been the Court’s
decision in Grosjean v. American Press Co., “that a corporation
engaged in the business of publishing or broadcasting enjoys the
same liberty of the press as is enjoyed by natural persons,”249 and in
NAACP v. Button, “that a nonprofit membership corporation organ-
ized for the purpose of ‘achieving ... equality of treatment by all
government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro
community’ enjoys certain liberties of political expression.”250 The
Court had never before considered “whether business corporations
have a constitutionally protected liberty to engage in political
activities,” and the majority was wrong, Justice Rehnquist argued,
not to give more deference to the judgment of the Massachusetts
court, the U.S. Congress, and the legislatures of the thirty other
states that determined that it is “politically desirable and constitu-
tionally permissible” to restrict the political activity of business
corporations.251 Citing Dartmouth College, Justice Rehnquist stated,
“our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protec-
tions are ‘incidental to [corporations’] very existence.’ ”252 Unlike “the
power to acquire and utilize property,” “[i]t cannot be so readily
concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary
to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial
247. Id. at 807.
248. Id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S.
243, 255 (1906)).
249. Id. (discussing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)).
250. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).
251. Id. at 822-23.
252. Id. at 824.
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purposes.”253 In fact, “those properties, so beneficial in the economic
sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.”254
After Bellotti, the Court’s corporate political speech jurisprudence
took some twists and turns outside of the ballot initiative context,255
but was extended to include a corporate right to spend on political
messages mentioning candidates so long as those messages did not
amount to express “vote for or vote against” advocacy.256 As in the
commercial speech cases, the Court has relied on the rights of
listeners rather than focusing on the identity of the speaker.257 This
rationale is instrumental—extending a right to corporations to
protect the rights of potential listeners, rather than the rights of the
corporation itself or the persons composing it.
In the Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
further expanded corporate political speech rights by invalidating
the federal ban on corporate expenditures from general treasury
funds for electioneering communications for or against a candidate
for public office.258 Previously, under the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), any such advertising could be funded
only through a corporation’s political action committee (PAC).259
Citizens United addressed the rights of a nonprofit corporation that
released a documentary through video-on-demand cable television
that was critical of Hillary Clinton, then a candidate in the Demo-
cratic Party’s 2008 presidential primary elections.260 Anticipating
that it would make this documentary, as well as television ads for
it, available within thirty days of primary elections, Citizens United
253. Id. at 824-25.
254. Id. at 826.
255. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (upholding limits on electioneering
communications); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding
a Michigan statute prohibiting use of corporate treasury funds for candidate-related expen-
ditures); FEC v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that a federal
prohibition on using corporate treasury funds for expenditures in a federal election
unconstitutionally burdened the rights of an anti-abortion nonprofit to publish a newsletter);
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1982) (holding that Congress could
prohibit a nonprofit from mass soliciting contributions to a segregated fund from nonmem-
bers). Citizens United overruled Austin and partly overruled McConnell. Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363-65 (2010).
256. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
257. E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778, 782.
258. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
259. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2012).
260. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319-20.
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sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the relevant
BCRA provision was unconstitutional as applied to the documentary
and the ads.261
Striking down earlier campaign finance precedent as well as
the BCRA provision at issue, the Court broadly extended its rul-
ing to all corporations.262 The Court eschewed ruling on narrower
grounds out of its stated concern about chilling speech,263 and its
view that the BCRA provision “is an outright ban” because PACs,
as separate associations, do not actually allow corporations to
speak and are “burdensome alternatives.”264 The Court explained
that “First Amendment protection extends to corporations,” includ-
ing in the context of political speech, because of the principle
established in Bellotti that “the Government cannot restrict politi-
cal speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”265 Notably, in
rejecting arguments that a compelling government interest existed
to support the BCRA limitation on corporate political spending, the
Court also relied on the Bellotti opinion’s notion of “the procedures
of corporate democracy,”266 and referred to corporations in multiple
instances as “association[s]” or “associations of citizens.”267
The Court’s statement that the corporate identity of the speaker
does not matter again implied an instrumental basis for the right—
it is the right of the listeners, not the right of the corporation, that
is being protected. Yet, the Court also drew on a view of the
corporation as an association that has procedures for expressing
dissenting viewpoints. The rhetoric of “associations” implies that the
Court also had in mind a derivative rationale for the right, but the
Court did not actually engage in the necessary analysis to identify
from whom such a right could be derived for its broad ruling as to
all corporations.268 In fact, in Citizens United, the Court moved away
261. Id. at 321.
262. See id. at 327 (explaining that the Court would not carve out an exception to the
expenditure ban “for nonprofit corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by
individuals”).
263. Id. at 333-36.
264. Id. at 337-39.
265. Id. at 342, 346.
266. Id. at 361-62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
267. Id. at 343, 349, 354, 356.
268. This is in contrast with the analysis provided in NAACP v. Button, in which the Court
made clear that in protecting a “nonprofit membership corporation,” it was protecting the
members. 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963).
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from its earlier attempts in campaign finance jurisprudence to
draw a line between nonprofits created to pursue ideological
agendas and business corporations.269
As with Bellotti, it is the Citizens United dissent rather than
majority opinion that is more consistent with the logic of earlier
Supreme Court jurisprudence extending protections to corporations
and that takes more account of modern corporations. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, ex-
plained that the majority was wrong to characterize the BCRA
provision as a ban because corporations can speak through PACs,
every shareholder and executive remains free to electioneer outside
of the corporate form, and ideologically inclined individuals could
use a 501(c)(4) corporation that does not accept corporate or union
money to make expenditures through a corporate form.270 The law
at issue “target[ed] a class of communications that is especially like-
ly to corrupt the political process, that is at least one degree
removed from the views of individual citizens, and that may not
even reflect the views of those who pay for it.”271 Moreover, the First
Amendment allows for distinctions to be drawn, including by the
speaker’s identity, as the government routinely restricts the speech
of students, prisoners, and its own employees, among others.272
In addition, “[c]ampaign finance distinctions based on corporate
identity tend to be less worrisome” because corporations “are not
natural persons,” and corporate political spending is “furthest from
the core of political expression, since corporations’ First Amendment
speech and association interests are derived largely from those of
their members and of the public in receiving information.”273
As the Court recognized in the nineteenth century, corporations
might receive protections in order to protect their members, but
those protections were limited in scope. Justice Stevens similarly
269. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (distinguishing between
ideological nonprofits and business corporations on the basis that the former’s funding
streams reflected support for the corporation’s political ideas whereas the latter’s did not and
the business corporation could use economic power to distort the political marketplace); see
also Monica Youn, First Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 135 (2011).
270. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 419.
272. Id. at 420-21.
273. Id. at 423-24 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 (2003)).
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argued that corporations received certain speech protections in
order to protect their members, but those protections could be lim-
ited in scope: “Corporations help structure and facilitate the activ-
ities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’ often serves
as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of
‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was
established.”274 Further, he recognized that included in the term
corporations are entities for which it is not clear “ ‘who’ is even
speaking when [they] ... place[ ] an advertisement that endorses or
attacks a particular candidate.”275 “Take away the ability to use
general treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one’s auton-
omy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the
least.”276
Finally, the Court further expanded corporate rights in the 2014
decision of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., concerning the
religious free exercise rights of for-profit corporations.277 Notably,
the Court did not base its decision on the First Amendment, but
rather rested on statutory grounds under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a statute passed by Congress to
restore broader protection for religious liberty after a Supreme
Court decision in 1990 dispensed with the stringent compelling
interest standard for First Amendment free exercise claims con-
cerning a neutral, generally applicable law.278 Nonetheless, Hobby
Lobby merits discussion here as it relates to corporate rights
jurisprudence and represents an expansion of religious liberty
protections for business corporations.
Hobby Lobby represented the claims of three corporations:
Conestoga Wood Specialties, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel.279 Con-
estoga Wood Specialties is a for-profit wood-working business. Five
members of a devout Christian family hold the corporation’s stock,
and the corporation employs 950 people. Hobby Lobby is a for-profit,
nationwide chain of arts-and-crafts stores. Five members of a Chris-
tian family control the corporation’s stock and the corporation
274. Id. at 466.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 467.
277. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
279. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66.
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employs over 13,000 people. Mardel is an affiliated business of
Hobby Lobby, which operates 35 for-profit Christian bookstores and
employs about 400 people.
At the heart of the case was a conflict between the claimed
religious beliefs of these three corporations and the Affordable Care
Act of 2010 (ACA), which requires employer healthcare plans to
include coverage of preventive care specified by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).280 The HHS regulations require
nonexempt employers to include coverage of contraception methods
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.281 The Hobby Lobby
corporations claimed that these regulations made them facilitate
access to contraceptive drugs and devices they equated with abor-
tion, violating their religious beliefs and their right to religious
freedom under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.282
In a controversial ruling, the Court accorded RFRA free exercise
rights to for-profit corporations for the first time. Specifically, the
Court held that the contraceptive coverage requirement of the HHS
regulations violated RFRA as applied to closely held, family-owned
businesses whose shareholders have sincerely held religious be-
liefs.283 To reach this result, the Court first determined that for-
profit corporations are included within the reach of RFRA, which
concerns “a person’s exercise of religion.” The Court relied on the
Dictionary Act’s inclusion of corporations within the term “person,”
as well as a derivative rights rationale.284 “A corporation is simply
a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired
ends,” Justice Alito wrote for the majority.285 “When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”286 To illustrate,
Justice Alito noted that the extension of “Fourth Amendment
protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employ-
ees and others associated with the company,” and “[p]rotecting cor-
porations from government seizure of their property without just
280. Id. at 2759.
281. Id. at 2762.
282. Id. at 2759.
283. Id. at 2774-75.
284. Id. at 2768-69.
285. Id. at 2768.
286. Id.
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compensation protects all those who have a stake in the corpora-
tions’ financial well-being.”287 This led to the conclusion that “pro-
tecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans
who own and control those companies.”288 Justice Alito did not
explain, however, why the shareholders were the appropriate
persons from whom to derive a religious exemption from an em-
ployee health benefit requirement for the corporation, despite one
of the corporations involved having more than 13,000 employees,
whose religious beliefs were not considered.
Finally, the Court determined that the contraceptive coverage
requirement did not meet RFRA’s compelling interest test as ap-
plied to Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga. The Court concluded
that the requirement substantially burdened the exercise of religion,
and although the requirement was assumed to be in furtherance of
a compelling government interest, it did not represent the least
restrictive means for furthering that interest.289 Thus, the corpora-
tions were exempted from the contraceptive coverage requirement.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, criticized each step of the majority’s
analysis.290 Critically, the dissent emphasized that for-profit corp-
orations embracing persons of diverse beliefs are different from reli-
gious organizations that exist to serve a community of believers in
the same religion.291 In addition, “ ‘[c]losely held’ is not synonymous
with ‘small,’ ” wrote Justice Ginsburg.292 The majority’s analysis
disregarded the impact on thousands of employees and dependents
who do not share the religious faith of the shareholders. RFRA
requires taking account of how a religious-based exemption would
harm others.293 Further, the majority failed to offer instruction on
how to resolve intracorporate controversy over religious values and
accommodations, merely pointing to state corporate law without
elaboration.294 As the dissent highlighted, although Hobby Lobby
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 2775-83.
290. Id. at 2787-2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 2793-98.
292. Id. at 2797 n.19.
293. Id. at 2801.
294. Id. at 2797 n.19.
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rests on statutory grounds rather than the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court has continued down a path of expanding the scope of
corporate rights without deeper examination into the complexities
of our time.
IV. TOWARDS A CONSISTENT FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
CORPORATE CLAIMS TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
The previous Parts have shown that the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions extending constitutional protections to corporations have
often been based on a view of corporations as artificial entities rep-
resenting associations of natural persons. The Court has extended
constitutional protections to corporations when it is a necessary or
convenient way to protect the rights of the natural persons assumed
to be represented by the corporation in question, at least with re-
spect to the issue at stake. Although never systematically explained
by the Court, the associational argument clearly indicates that the
Court understands corporate rights to be derivative rights, not di-
rect or original rights.295 In the context of commercial speech and
corporate political spending, the Court has continued to use this
derivative rights logic and has at times added an instrumental
rationale—to protect the interests of natural persons outside the
corporation.
With this unarticulated framework, the Court has found that
corporations have some rights (e.g., equal protection, due process,
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures), but not
all of the rights that natural persons have (privileges and immun-
ities, protection against self-incrimination, voting). The latter
rights inhere in a person in his or her individual capacity, and
individuals are fully protected as to these interests without extend-
ing the right to corporations—in fact, extending the privilege
against self-incrimination or the right to vote to corporations could
undermine justice and the political process.
295. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 57-78 (1986) (discussing
the concept of original and derivative rights); ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL
THEORY OF THE FIRM 9-51 (2013) (discussing theories of the corporation, including the
“bottom-up” perspective which views the corporation as derivatively representing the interests
of participants).
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The Court has not, however, consistently or carefully distinguish-
ed different types of corporations in its constitutional rights
decisions. This oversight was potentially problematic even by the
late nineteenth century when the Court decided some of the impor-
tant early corporate rights cases, and it has become more problem-
atic over time. The corporate form is used for political units, such
as townships, for nonprofit organizations ranging from food banks
or small environmental action groups to large universities and
churches, and for clubs and membership associations. It is used by
for-profit business organizations, ranging from small closely held
businesses to huge, publicly traded, multinational corporations. It
is even used by corporations to create entities such as “special pur-
pose vehicles” (SPVs) that have no employees and only a single
shareholder (which is another corporation), as a legal way to parti-
tion assets and liabilities.296 Corporations from the above list of
categories often have little in common with each other besides the
fact that they fall under the label of “corporation.” They cannot all
be fairly regarded as mere associations of persons.
In this final Part, we examine how the underlying logic of much
of the Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence could be used to make
more principled decisions, taking account of the spectrum of modern
corporations. We then grapple with some of the conceptual chal-
lenges that recur in corporate rights determinations.
A. Using the Logic of the Derivative Rights Rationale
As the Court has been deciding the scope of corporate rights for
over two centuries, we do not start our exploration with a clean
slate. We cannot return to a world in which corporations have no
recognized constitutional protections. And, even if such a result
were plausible, through a constitutional amendment or otherwise,
it is not clear that it would be ideal. According rights to corporations
often recognizes that human interests are at stake and doing so has
served important functions, particularly in bolstering the utility of
296. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2004); Comm. on Bankr. and Corporate Reorg. of the Ass’n of
the Bar of the City of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527 (1995); see
also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133,
135 (1994).
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the corporate form as a means of pooling capital to engage in long-
term and large-scale business activities. For example, the Court’s
nineteenth-century jurisprudence according property and contract
rights to corporations assured investors of certain basic protections
in using the corporate form and guarded against the arbitrary and
deleterious exercise of government power. The history of corpora-
tions through this time illustrates the vast contributions that cor-
porations, so protected, have made to the country’s infrastructure
and economic development. Likewise, the other extreme of according
corporations all of the constitutional rights that natural persons
enjoy would also be unfounded. Corporations organize human activi-
ty, but they are not the equivalent of individuals. Neither ex-
treme—of corporations having no rights or having all of the same
rights as natural persons—is plausible or desirable.
As a general matter, the Court has therefore been asking the
correct question in most cases—an incremental question about
whether extending a particular right to a corporation protects the
rights of actual people and serves the purpose of the constitutional
provision at issue. The Court has largely done this on an ad hoc
basis, however, through the language of its associational view of
corporations and its unarticulated derivative rights framework.
The derivative nature of rights for corporations requires the
Court to pay attention to distinctions, to explicitly acknowledge
that, for some purposes, some corporations can usefully and func-
tionally be regarded as aggregates of their members from whom
rights could be derived, while other corporations serve other pur-
poses, and cannot be regarded as representing any particular
natural person or group of natural persons. The latter is made
possible by one of the essential characteristics of the corporate
form—that incorporation creates a separate entity under the law.297
This characteristic has allowed for the growth of corporations in
size, as well as for corporations to serve as lasting institutions, with
organizational dynamics that cannot easily be tied to identifiable
groups of people.298
297. See Blair, supra note 103, at 407 (discussing the importance of entity status to build-
ing lasting institutions with substantial enterprise-specific assets and specialized organ-
izational structures not tied to any individual participants).
298. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764
(2012) (discussing perpetual existence as one of the core legal attributes of the corporate
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In Citizens United, for example, there was an identifiable group
of natural persons who associated to engage in political advocacy.299
Though the specific individuals behind the corporation might not
have been publicly named, they were, nonetheless, a finite identifi-
able group who had joined together for the specific speech-related
purpose. The Court appropriately recognized a derivative right for
such an organization.
By contrast, it would not even be possible to identify all of the
individual natural persons who might be said to be “represented” by,
say, The Coca-Cola Company, which has hundreds of thousands of
shareholders, many of them other corporations, and the mix of
shareholders changes minute by minute. According to its website,
Coca-Cola also has more than 130,000 worldwide “associates,” 250
“bottling partners,” 23 million retail customer outlets, 468 “commu-
nity water partnership projects,”300 40 “agriculture sustainability
initiatives,” and countless numbers of other individuals who interact
with, or are affected by the company on a regular basis.301 Even if
we could identify the subset of all of these individuals who are U.S.
citizens or residents, who would, in theory, be entitled to constitu-
tional protections, it could not be argued that those individuals
chose to associate with each other through Coca-Cola for the
purpose of expressing themselves politically, or that protecting
freedom of speech rights for Coca-Cola would protect the rights of
expression of any identifiable group of real people behind the
corporation. Thus, the Court’s decision to broadly rule as to all
corporations in Citizens United was unsupported by the logic of
derivative rights and by the Court’s own prior jurisprudence. It
could have instead used this logic to draw lines—to do so it would
have had to engage with the reality that it was not accurate to
characterize all corporations as “associations of citizens.”
form); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015)
(discussing the corporate form as a legal innovation that allows wealth to be transferred
forward and backward through time by virtue of its separate legal identity and perpetual
existence).
299. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-20 (2010).
300. Coca-Cola 2012/2013 GRI Report, COCA-COLA CO. (2013), http://assets.coca-cola
company.com/44/d4/e4eb8b6f4682804bdf6ba2ca89b8/2012-2013-gri-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
A8TC-SU4P].
301. Id.
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We therefore observe that a more principled path forward re-
quires the Court to carefully determine whether there is a factual
foundation to support an extension of derivative rights to the
corporation at hand. As corporate rights are derivative in nature, it
would seem imperative that if the Court is going to recognize a
corporate right, it be able to identify the specific group of natural
persons from whom the corporate right is derived. Broad rulings as
to all corporations do not suffice. Further, the natural persons said
to be represented by the corporation must have joined in association
for purposes related to the right at issue in the case. The corporation
must represent their interests. Otherwise, there is simply no source
for a derivative right.
Our next observation concerns the second rationale the Court has
offered for recognizing freedom of speech protections for corpora-
tions—that a purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure an
informed citizenry who have a right to hear or receive informa-
tion.302 According to this rationale, corporations must be allowed to
engage in politically expressive and commercial speech, so that
voters and consumers can have the benefit of the knowledge and
expertise that the corporation possesses. This argument recognizes
that corporations can sometimes be important repositories of
knowledge and expertise.303
But the right of potential listeners to hear is a weaker basis for
corporate speech rights because it is further attenuated from a
natural person with an original basis for the right.304 The right is
accorded to the corporation only instrumentally, as a means of
constraining the government from regulating speech that listeners
should be able to hear.
As the grounds for the right is instrumental, it implies some
additional basis for constraint or regulation. For example, individu-
als are not allowed to shield themselves from liability for fraud,
302. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339-41, 343; First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776-77, 783 (1978).
303. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECO-
NOMIC CHANGE 14 (1982) (defining and explaining “routines” as a mechanism by which
knowledge gained from prior experience is stored in corporations); Blair, supra note 103, at
394-95.
304. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 295, at 104; see also ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (2014).
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slander, or libel, on the grounds that listeners have the right to hear
their speech, even if it is false or misleading.
Further, if speech rights for corporations are justified based on
the right of listeners to hear what the corporations have to say, then
it is the speech that is the target for protection, not the corporation.
The interests of listeners are the concern and it is their interests
and liberties that should be protected. It follows, for example, that
restrictions made to promote political equality and curb the distor-
ting or “drowning out” effects of corporate spending—known as the
“antidistortion interest”—are on more solid ground than the Citizens
United majority and dissenting opinions acknowledged.305 Restric-
tions made for this purpose serve to further the interests of
listeners, who are the source or reason for extending protections to
corporations in the first instance.
In addition, it follows that corporate speech protections relying on
the instrumental rationale could be premised on listeners having
access to information about who is behind the speech, what the
factual basis for the speech is, and how it is that the corporation has
special knowledge and expertise on the topic of the speech. In the
case of political speech in particular, there is a public interest in
knowing the source of the speech.306 The value of speech as informa-
tion in the marketplace of ideas often depends on knowing the iden-
tity of the speaker. For example, a group called “Littleton Neighbors
Voting No” recently spent $170,000 in a Colorado ballot measure
election in order to defeat a zoning restriction that would have kept
out a new Wal-Mart store.307 It came to light that the group was
exclusively funded by Wal-Mart, and was not a grassroots group as
its name suggested.308 The informational value of speech from
305. For an argument that the antidistortion rationale did not deserve to be rejected by the
majority or abandoned and muddled by the dissent, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United
and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 990, 999 (2011).
306. Eight Justices in Citizens United voted in favor of the constitutionality of disclaimer
and disclosure requirements. The majority opinion noted that disclaimers “insure that the
voters are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking.” Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 368 (internal quotation omitted); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792, n. 32 (“Identif-
ication of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the
people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”).
307. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Comments Before the Securities and Exchange Commission
Regarding Petition File No. 4-637 10 (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-
13.pdf [http://perma.cc/4W9C-L23Z].
308. Id.
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“Littleton Neighbors” is significantly affected by whether the listen-
er knows its specific corporate source of funding. Thus, to the extent
corporations are accorded rights for political speech on the basis of
listeners’ rights, regulation requiring disclosure of the source of
corporate political spending is justified.309
Information regarding the source of the speech may also give
insight into the factual basis or expertise for the speech. For exam-
ple, Coca-Cola probably has expertise on issues such as interna-
tional trade, water rights, and franchising and trademark rules, and
as long as Coca-Cola is clearly identified as the source of the speech,
an argument can be made that the public has a right to have access
to information or perspectives disseminated by Coca-Cola on such
issues. But it seems unlikely that Coca-Cola would have special ex-
pertise that is worthy of constitutional protection on matters such
as veterans benefits or same-sex marriage. On issues such as these,
which have no connection to the business activities that the
corporation is involved in, the derivative rationale for protecting
corporate speech is nonexistent (whose rights would be protected?),
and the instrumental rationale is weak (how would the available
public knowledge be enriched?). Thus, at least with respect to
matters such as these, the Court should not require that the
government show a compelling justification for regulation.310 If
corporate executives or other persons connected to the corporation
have personal views on such matters, they would in no way be
restricted from expressing them individually even if for some reason
restrictions were imposed on corporations.
In sum, before extending a constitutional protection to a corpora-
tion, the Court should carefully consider whether the corporation
represents an identifiable group of persons associating for a purpose
related to the right in question,311 or whether the corporation is
more appropriately regarded as having its own interests in the
309. For literature discussing the disclosure of corporate political spending, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO.
L.J. 923, 924-28 (2013); and Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to
Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593 (2014).
310. The less stringent commercial speech standard might be more appropriate. This could
be an area for future consideration. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
311. See supra Part I.
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matter, distinct from that of any specific group of individuals.312 If
it is the former, the purpose of the right at issue may be served by
according the right to the corporation—doing so could be necessary
or convenient to ensure that the rights of the individuals involved
are protected. If it is the latter, the corporation does not have a di-
rect or derivative claim to constitutional protection. The only basis
for extending constitutional protection to a corporation in this cir-
cumstance would be for an instrumental purpose, which suggests
additional constraint or regulation may be appropriate to carry out
such purpose.
The line drawing that we are advocating will be difficult. There
will be corporations and circumstances that do not clearly fit in the
same category as a non-profit political advocacy organization such
as Citizens United speaking on the fitness of a candidate for public
office, nor in the category of Coca-Cola speaking about international
trade matters. Nonetheless, these are the considerations that the
Court should be focused on in deciding future cases of corporate
political spending, free exercise, and other determinations—not
metaphysical questions about the meaning of the legal designation
of corporations as “persons” or the facile characterization of all cor-
porations as “associations.”
B. Conceptual Challenges in Corporate Rights Determinations
In this final Section, we discuss some lingering conceptual chal-
lenges in corporate rights determinations. The first concerns our
proposal that if the Court is going to rely on a derivative rights
rationale to accord a corporation a constitutional right, the Court
should be able to identify the specific group of natural persons from
whom the right is derived. This raises obvious questions about how
specifically the protected persons must be identified. Must they be
identified by name, as the Court listed the five family members who
own a controlling share of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.?313 Would it
suffice to have a general sense of the persons involved, even if
particular identities are unknown or undisclosed as the Court
allowed in NAACP v. Alabama, in which the very issue at stake was
312. See supra Part III.
313. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014).
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the members’ right to associate without disclosing their affilia-
tion?314 Would it suffice to simply refer to generic categories such as
shareholders or members, as the Court did in Citizens United?315
Whatever test the Court used would have an impact on which
corporations would be accorded various constitutional protections.
Our instincts at this time encourage us to believe that the persons
whose rights are arguably being protected by according the corpora-
tion a right should be a relatively stable group and at least identifi-
able, if not actually identified. It would be hard to justify, for
example, extending a derivative right to a corporation in order to
protect the rights of a rapidly changing body of shareholders in
large, publicly traded corporations, many of whom are not U.S.
citizens or even individual persons but, rather, financial institutions
and other corporations.316 Other corporate participants in large,
publicly traded corporations, such as managers and employees, may
be relatively more stable in their association with the corporation
but still change frequently, and many corporations have disaggre-
gated production models with operations carried out overseas and
through contractors.317
 This line of thinking, we believe, would provide some discipline
and set some boundaries around the granting of rights to corpora-
tions by keeping the emphasis on whose rights would be protected
by doing so. More generally, we suspect that if our analysis were
used, a narrower scope of constitutional protections would be
accorded to large, publicly traded corporations, but it would not
have to mean a denial of all protections so long as sufficiently
important public policy reasons existed to hold otherwise.
For example, while the rationale for granting corporations prop-
erty and contract rights in the nineteenth-century cases was
derivative—the Court saw itself as protecting the rights of the
314. 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
315. 558 U.S. 310, 361-62, 370 (2010).
316. For a discussion of the intermediation of the U.S. capital markets, see Jill E. Fisch,
Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership From Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 877 (2010). For a discussion of short term and high frequency trading, see Lynne L.
Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265
(2012).
317. See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2011) (discussing the “Nikefication” of production for many U.S. public
corporations using overseas contract manufacturing and a disaggregated model).
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natural persons who were investors in corporations—the rationale
for granting property and contract rights to large, publicly traded
corporations in contemporary times may more appropriately be
regarded as instrumental. That is, the persons composing the large,
publicly traded corporation may not be a stable, identifiable group
of persons from whom rights could be derived, but some rights could
still be accorded on an instrumental basis, akin to Justice Rehn-
quist’s suggestion in his Bellotti dissent that corporations should
only have rights “incidental” to their existence—those necessary to
carry out the functions of corporations organized for commercial
purposes.318 In Justice Rehnquist’s words, “[t]here can be little doubt
that when a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire
and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that
the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due
process of law.”319 Granting property and contract protections to
corporations is fundamental to the utility of the corporate form and
protects the integrity of financial markets by preventing the
arbitrary taking of property from private hands by the government.
But not all constitutional rights are incidental to the purposes for
which states permit corporations to be organized, or could be
otherwise justified by the interests of third parties. This approach
therefore suggests a narrower, more tailored scope of rights, partic-
ularly for large, publicly traded corporations. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, every individual remains
free to exercise their constitutional rights outside of the corporate
form.320
Another set of questions that commonly arise in corporate rights
determinations is which corporate participants should count in the
analysis and what to do when competing interests exist within the
corporation. This is a critically important issue for developing a
coherent understanding of derivative rights, yet the Supreme Court
has failed to give it much consideration.
Parts I and III illustrate that the Court has often looked to the
shareholders as the relevant persons from whom to derive rights or
has simply referred more vaguely to “members,” “individuals,” and
318. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
319. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
320. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“corporators” behind the corporation. Looking solely to shareholders
might have made sense in the nineteenth century when the Court
was answering questions regarding the contract and property
interests of corporations. And, at any rate, we can expect corporate
participants’ interests to be largely aligned with respect to basic
contract and property protections for the corporation.
Once the Court arrived at questions of expressive or religious
rights for business corporations in contemporary times, however,
this was no longer the case and the Court did not have a ready
means for determining who should count in the calculation.321 At
times, the Court has pointed to state corporate law as the mecha-
nism for resolving these questions, as in Bellotti and Citizens United
when the Court referred to “the procedures of corporate democra-
cy.”322 In Hobby Lobby, when the Court discussed the concept of
derivative rights, it referred to the people associated with the corpo-
ration as “including shareholders, officers, and employees.”323 And
when the Court gave examples, it pointed to Fourth Amendment
protection for corporations as “protect[ing] the privacy interests of
employees and others associated with the company.”324 When
applying this logic to the religious liberty rights at issue, however,
the Court merely looked to the “humans who own and control” the
corporations.325 The Court also responded briefly to “concern about
the possibility of disputes among owners of corporations” by
pointing simply to state corporate law for resolving disagreements
about “the conduct of business.”326 The Court did not explain why it
would mention employees when generally referring to derivative
rights logic and Fourth Amendment protections for corporations, but
not when analyzing whether corporations should have religious
liberty rights to exempt them from employee healthcare benefit
regulations.
The issue of which corporate participants to consider for purposes
of derivative rights cannot be easily answered by reference to state
corporate law or even corporate law theory. State corporate law
321. See supra Part III.C.
322. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
323. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2775.
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provides rules for the internal governance of the corporation, and
thus gives insight into who the corporate participants are and what
their roles are within the corporation. But how that translates to
questions of rights under the Constitution is not obvious. Theories
of the corporation could be helpful for buttressing analysis, but they
do not provide a single uncontroverted answer.327
We believe these issues of who should count in the analysis and
what to do when competing interests exist within the corporation
merit future work. We are inclined to believe that because no read-
ily available answers exist in corporate or constitutional law, the
question of who should count toward derivative rights should be
analyzed pragmatically on a right-by-right basis so as to serve the
intended purpose of the right. When there are competing interests
within the corporation as to a particular right, a more cautious
approach to according corporate rights is in order because of the
danger of impinging on liberties and because individual rights are
still available outside of the corporate form. Our discussion is of-
fered here to begin that discussion.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have traced two hundred years of constitu-
tional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has
relied upon an unarticulated understanding of corporate rights as
derivative and instrumental. At the same time, the Court has failed
to reconcile this approach with the changed nature of business
corporations. Although the Court has not made the mistake of
personifying corporations in the way that is popularly imagined, it
also has not taken account of large, modern business corporations
that cannot be seen as representing an association of identifiable
people. Yet the logic of the Court’s own framework of corporate
rights as derivative and instrumental offers a principled path
327. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201
(discussing “how theories of the corporation have developed and changed over the last
hundred and fifty years”); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1862-64 (2003) (discussing how twentieth-century
legal and social thought moved away from a vision of business corporations that included
employees to a focus on shareholders vis-à-vis managers to the exclusion of other corporate
constituencies).
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forward for the difficult line-drawing between corporations that
needs to be done. If a corporate right is premised on being derivative
in nature, then it would seem imperative that the Court be able to
identify the group of persons from whom the right is derived. Some
corporations can be appropriately characterized as a group of
identifiable persons, while others cannot. If a protection is accorded
to corporations on an instrumental rationale, this is a weaker basis
for the right because it is further attenuated from natural persons
with an original basis for the right, and this suggests grounds for
addressing countervailing interests and the need for regulation.
The complexities of implementing such a framework are undoubt-
edly significant, but these are exactly the complexities that must be
confronted.
       
